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We develop a model of international trade with export quality requirements and two dimensions of
firm heterogeneity. In addition to "productivity", firms are also heterogeneous in their "caliber" —
the ability to produce quality using fewer fixed inputs. Compared to single-attribute models of firm
heterogeneity emphasizing either productivity or the ability to produce quality, our model provides
a more nuanced characterization of firms' exporting behavior. In particular, it explains the empirical
fact that firm size is not monotonically related with export status: there are small firms that export
and large firms that only operate in the domestic market. The model also delivers novel testable predictions.
Conditional on size, exporters are predicted to sell products of higher quality and at higher prices,
pay higher wages and use capital more intensively. These predictions, although apparently intuitive,
cannot be derived from single-attribute models of firm heterogeneity as they imply no variation in
export status after size is controlled for. We find strong support for the predictions of our model in
manufacturing establishment datasets for India, the U.S., Chile, and Colombia.
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Understanding what determines ﬁrms’ export behavior and performance is one of the most impor-
tant open questions in international trade. At a policy level, the impressive export performances of
rapidly-growing developing countries (World Bank 1987, 1993) suggests that export growth might
play a key role in helping countries attain high income levels. Also, as governments increasingly
view export development as an important objective that justiﬁes policies aimed at fostering it,
understanding what makes ﬁrms export should help enhance the eﬀectiveness of such policies.1
More generally, identifying determinants of ﬁrms’ exporting behavior is critical for answering the
question of what determines trade patterns across countries, the ﬁeld’s core question in the last
two centuries.
While work in international trade has traditionally focused on determinants of trade operating
at the sector level, a growing new literature emphasizes the role played by factors operating at
the level of the ﬁrm. In this literature a single attribute, heterogeneously distributed across ﬁrms,
is usually modeled as the sole determinant of ﬁrms’ ability to conduct business successfully, both
domestically and abroad. This attribute is often modeled as productivity (e.g. Bernard et al.
2003, Melitz 2003, Chaney 2008, Arkolakis 2008), or alternatively as the ability to produce quality
(Baldwin and Harrigan 2007, Johnson 2008, Verhoogen 2008, Kugler and Verhoogen 2008). In
either case the models share the property that the endowment of this attribute perfectly predicts
ﬁrms’ revenue (henceforth our measure of ﬁrm size) and export status. Moreover, the models
predict a threshold ﬁrm size above which all ﬁrms export — and below which none do.
Although these models parsimoniously explain the salient fact that exporters tend to be large
(Clerides et al. 1998, Bernard and Jensen 1999), the prediction of a threshold ﬁrm size for export,
common to single-attribute models, is contradicted in the data by a large number of “anomalous”
ﬁrms. Notable among them are “born globals” — small and recently established ﬁrms with a strong
export orientation (Oviatt and McDougall 1994, Rialp et al. 2005), and “local dynamos” — large
ﬁrms that are successful in their domestic markets but do not sell abroad (Boston Consulting Group
2008). More generally, the models leave much of the observed relationship between ﬁrm size and
export status unexplained. As a preview of the data we will describe later in more detail, Figure
1 plots, for each of the four countries in our sample, the fraction of exporters in each of 40 size
quantiles (deﬁned by industry).2 Though this fraction increases with size, there are still many
1The number of export promotion agencies in the world has tripled in the last two decades (Lederman et al. 2007).
2To be consistent with our model, Figure 1 uses data for diﬀerentiated products. Appendix ﬁgure A.1 shows a
2exporters among the smallest ﬁrms as well as a substantial fraction of ﬁrms with no export activity
even among ﬁrms at the top of the size distribution.
This paper develops a partial-equilibrium heterogeneous-ﬁrm model with endogenous product
quality that can explain the lack of a one-to-one relationship between ﬁrm size and export status
observed in these graphs.3 The model embeds two sources of heterogeneity: “productivity” is the
ability to produce output using fewer variable inputs — as is typically modeled in the literature;
“caliber” is the ability to produce quality with fewer ﬁxed outlays. Product quality shifts out
product demand but increases marginal costs of production and ﬁxed costs of product development.
Although caliber is the primary determinant of quality choice, productivity also aﬀe c t st h i sc h o i c e
by reducing the impact of quality on marginal costs. Therefore, both caliber and productivity
increase ﬁrm’s optimal choice of quality.
We describe and analyze the equilibrium in a trade environment with export quality constraints.
In the presence of these constraints, high-productivity low-caliber ﬁrms are large in size, but refrain
from exporting because they ﬁnd the cost of satisfying the export quality constraint excessively
onerous. In turn, low-productivity high-caliber ﬁrms are active in the export market despite being
small. More generally, the model implies that export success might depend critically on ﬁrm
capabilities that are not as essential for domestic success.
We ﬁrst solve for the industry equilibrium in the closed economy and in a benchmark case of
an open economy with no export quality constraints. In both cases, productivity (ϕ)a n dc a l i b e r
(ξ) can be combined into a single “ability” parameter η (η = η(ϕ,ξ)) such that key variables of
interest can be expressed in terms of this scalar parameter. For example, regardless of the particular
combinations of ϕ and ξ, ﬁrms with the same value of η have identical revenue, proﬁts, and export
status (though they choose diﬀerent quality levels and charge diﬀerent prices). Furthermore, the
model allows for a representation isomorphic to Melitz’s (2003) model. A threshold ability level
(η) determines survival, while another threshold ability level (ηu) determines ﬁrms’ participation
in the export market. The isomorphism with Melitz’ model is appealing as it makes the case with
no export quality constraints a transparent benchmark.
N e x tw ea n a l y z et h ef u l lm o d e l ,w h e r ew ea s s u m et h a tﬁrms are required to meet a minimum
quality requirement to export.4 Although simplistic, this assumption captures a wealth of evidence
similar pattern including all industries.
3We later discuss alternative dimensions of heterogeneity that could also explain the patterns observed in Figure
1 but not all the remaining predictions of the model.
4A similar assumption is made by Rauch (2007) in a model with homogenous ﬁrms.
3suggesting that export success is associated with ﬁrms’ ability to satisfy quality constraints.5 While
diﬀerent reasons — discussed later — can be invoked to justify the existence of these constraints, our
aim in this paper is not to identify their particular source but rather to identify their presence by
examining its impact on ﬁrms’ exporting behavior.
In the presence of export quality constraints, our model implies that the size of a ﬁrm is no
longer suﬃcient information to infer its export status. In particular, a ﬁrm that does not export
(high ϕ,l o wξ) might have equal sales revenue as an exporting ﬁrm (low ϕ,h i g hξ). Because
of its high productivity, the former ﬁrm can compensate its lack of foreign revenue with higher
domestic sales. This prediction can explain the heterogeneity in exporting behavior within size
groups observed in Figure 1.
While a variety of economic forces diﬀerent from those we propose here can potentially explain
Figure 1, our assessment of the model’s empirical relevance relies on empirically testing the distinct
set of additional predictions it delivers. In particular, our model predicts systematic diﬀerences
between exporters and non-exporters conditional on ﬁrm size.S p e c i ﬁcally, conditional on ﬁrm
size exporters are predicted to produce higher quality and sell at higher prices than non-exporters.
Also, to the extent that production of quality goods requires more intensive use of skilled labor and
capital, exporters should pay higher average wages and be more capital intensive. In sum, the model
predicts conditional exporter premia in quality, price, average wage, and capital intensity. Thus,
in a regression framework with quality, price, average wage or capital intensity as the dependent
variable and size controls, the conditional exporter premia should manifest in a positive coeﬃcient
on an export dummy.
The prediction of conditional exporter premia in our model is conceptually very diﬀerent from
the unconditional exporter premia predicted by recently proposed single-attribute models with
quality heterogeneity (Baldwin and Harrigan 2007, Johnson 2008, Kugler and Verhoogen 2008,
Crozet et al. 2008). In those models, exporters are predicted to be systematically diﬀerent
5The international management literature widely acknowledges quality as a key requisite to access foreign markets
(e.g. Guler et al. 2002, Gosen et al. 2005). In particular, several studies based on ﬁrm-level surveys both in
developed and developing countries (e.g. Weston 1995, Erel and Ghosh 1997, Mersha 1997, Anderson et al. 1999,
Corbett 2005) document satisfying the demands of international buyers as a critical motivation for obtaining quality
management certiﬁcation (ISO 9000). Studies in international trade, using census or large ﬁrm—level datasets, ﬁnd
that quality strongly inﬂuences ﬁrms’ ability to export (Brooks 2006, Verhoogen 2008, Iacovone and Javorcik 2008).
Finally, international organizations emphasize the attainment of quality standards as a crucial requirement for export
competitiveness (International Trade Center 2005, World Bank 1999).
4from non-exporters, particularly in size. But since size, quality, prices, and export status are
all monotonically-related variables, once size is conditioned upon there is no variation left in the
other variables. As a result, in the regression speciﬁcation described above the coeﬃcient on the
export dummy should be zero. While estimation of positive conditional exporter premia has been
customary in the empirical literature (e.g. Bernard and Jensen 1999, Fajnzylber and Fernandes
2006, Iaccovone and Javorcik 2008, Kugler and Verhoogen 2008) our paper is the ﬁrst to provide a
framework that makes sense of this empirical ﬁnding.
We test the predictions of our model employing manufacturing ﬁrm-level data from four coun-
tries: India, the United States, Chile, and Colombia. Since quality is not observable, our main
testable prediction is the conditional exporter price premium. This prediction is tested using data
for India and the U.S. as these countries’ datasets include product-level information on revenue
and quantities that allows us to calculate unit values. For Chile and Colombia, the datasets do
not include such information but contain data on ﬁrms’ wages and capital that can be used to
test the ancillary predictions of conditional exporter premia on factor use. Consistent with the
model predictions, we ﬁnd positive and signiﬁcant conditional exporter premia for prices, average
wage and capital intensity.6 We ﬁnd that the results are consistent across countries and robust to
a number of alternative speciﬁcations. Also, our robustness analysis addresses potential concerns
about measurement error in revenue and rules out potential alternative explanations of our results.
This paper is related to a growing literature proposing international trade models with more
than one source of heterogeneity. In section 5.2.1, we reference the relevant studies and discuss why
those models cannot account for the empirical facts we document here.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our theoretical model. Section
3 describes the data. Section 4 presents our baseline results. Section 5 performs several robustness
checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Productivity and quality in a two-factor heterogeneous-ﬁrm model
This section develops a two-factor heterogeneous-ﬁrm model. In section 2.1, we characterize the
equilibrium in a closed economy. In section 2.2, we examine the case of a benchmark open econ-
omy with no export quality constraints. In section 2.3, we introduce minimum export quality
6The only exception, concerning capital-intensity in the U.S., is discussed later.
7Sutton (2007) allows for ﬁrm heterogeneity in “productivity” and “quality” in the close economy but not in the
open economy.
5requirements and analyze the open-economy equilibrium in the presence of those requirements.
2.1 The closed economy
2.1.1 Set up
The model is developed in partial equilibrium. We assume a monopolistic competition framework
with constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) demand. The demand system here is augmented to






,σ > 1, (1)
where j indexes product varieties while pj and λj are, respectively, the price and quality of variety
j.E a c hﬁrm produces only one variety, so j also indexes ﬁrms. E is the (exogenously given) level






Product quality is modeled as a demand shifter that captures all attributes of a product — other
than price — that consumers value. The demand system (1) solves a consumer maximization problem
with a Dixit-Stiglitz utility function deﬁned in terms of quality-adjusted units of consumption,
e qj = qjλj, and quality adjusted prices e pj =
pj
λj.T h u s , ﬁrm revenues, rj = pjqj = e pje qj,c a nb e
expressed as:




Equation (2) indicates that larger ﬁrms charge lower quality-adjusted prices.
The model allows for two sources of ﬁrm heterogeneity. Following standard models (Melitz 2003,
Bernard et al. 2003), the ﬁrst source of heterogeneity is “productivity”, ϕ, which reduces variable




λβ, 0 ≤ β<1, (3)
where c is a constant parameter. β is lower than unity — i.e. marginal costs increase with quality but
not excessively fast — to ensure concavity of the proﬁt function. Also, marginal costs are assumed
to be independent of scale and increasing in product quality (λ).
In addition to productivity, there is a second source of heterogeneity we denote “caliber” (ξ).
Caliber indexes ﬁrms’ ability to develop high quality products paying low ﬁxed costs. Fixed costs




λα,α > (1 − β)(σ − 1), (4)
8P
1−σ is the cost-of-utility index for a CES utility function. Note that P is inversely related to product prices.
6where F0 is a ﬁxed cost of plant operation and f is a constant.9 Attaining higher quality requires
paying higher ﬁxed costs. Moreover, the condition that α>(1 − β)(σ − 1), imposed to ensure
concavity, implies that ﬁxed costs grow suﬃciently fast with quality. Conditional on attaining a
given quality level, the ﬁxed costs are lower for high-caliber ﬁrms.10
2.1.2 Firm’s optimal choice of price and quality
Firms choose price and quality to maximize post-entry proﬁts, Π, which are the diﬀerence between
operative proﬁts, Π0,a n dﬁxed costs. The ﬁrst order condition with respect to price yields the





d.11 Using this result, the ﬁrst

















where α0 ≡ α−(1 − β)(σ − 1) > 0. Both productivity (ϕ)a n dc a l i b e r( ξ) have a positive impact on
quality choice since they reduce, respectively, marginal costs and ﬁxed costs of quality production.




















Conditional on ϕ,h i g h - ξ ﬁrms sell their products more expensively because they produce higher
quality and hence have higher marginal costs. Instead, the eﬀect of ϕ on price conditional on ξ is
ambiguous. On the one hand, productivity lowers marginal costs and thus prices. On the other
hand, it induces a higher quality choice, which in turn raises marginal costs and prices. Whether one
or the other eﬀect dominates depends on the sign of α−(σ−1). In equation (6), prices depend on the
value of two parameters. Therefore, in contrast with the predictions of quality-based models with
a single heterogeneous factor (Baldwin and Harrigan 2007, Johnson 2008, Kugler and Verhoogen
2008), prices here are not monotone functions of productivity and size.
9In Appendix 4, we derive c and f as a function of deeper parameters.
10This approach to modeling quality captures the trade-oﬀs present in Yeaple (2005) and Bustos (2005), where the
adoption of a superior technology reduces marginal costs but requires ﬁrms to incur a ﬁxed cost. Under our demand
assumptions, this type of investment would be isomorphic to one that shifts out the demand curve, but only in a
world with no export quality constraints.
11Subindex d denotes “domestic” ﬁrms, those that only sell in the domestic market (all ﬁrms are d in this section).
72.1.3 The cut-oﬀ function


























, as an increasing function of productivity (ϕ)a n dc a l i b e r( ξ).
From standard results of CES demand we know that operative proﬁts equal r
σ. Therefore,
Πd = 1





























.P r o ﬁts also are increasing in productivity and caliber.
Firms remain in the market only if they can make non-negative proﬁts (Πd ≥ 0). Since proﬁts
















For each productivity level ϕ, there is a minimum caliber such that ﬁrms above this minimum
earn non-negative proﬁts. The cut-oﬀ function ξ(ϕ) is decreasing in ϕ, highlighting a trade-oﬀ for
survival between ϕ and ξ: more (less) productive ﬁrms can aﬀord to be of lower (higher) caliber.
The function ξ(ϕ) i sd i s p l a y e di nF i g u r e2 .E a c hﬁrm, characterized by a pair of draws (ϕ,ξ),c a n
be represented in the ﬁgure by a single point. Firms above ξ(ϕ) survive while those below this
curve exit the market.
A convenient way of summarizing information about ﬁrms’ productivity and caliber is to deﬁne



























The main implication of this property is that η is a summary statistic for ϕ and ξ in both functions,
which depend on these heterogeneous factors only through η.T h u sﬁrms with equal η,e . g .t h o s e
12This is also true for pure prices (see (2)). Firms with higher (lower) η charge lower (higher) pure prices.
8along ξ(ϕ), obtain equal revenue and equal proﬁts regardless of the particular combinations of ϕ
and ξ. In Figure 2, this property implies that iso-ability curves are also iso-revenue curves and
iso-proﬁt curves. Due to this property, the model can be collapsed into a one-dimensional model
iso-morphic to Melitz (2003). In particular, as in the latter model we can think of η as a single
productivity draw that determines entry-exit decisions: ﬁrms survive iﬀ η is above a cut-oﬀ value
η, determined such that Πd(η)=0 . This cut-oﬀ value satisﬁes η = η(ϕ,ξ (ϕ)).13
2.1.4 Free-entry and industry equilibrium
Before entering the industry, ﬁrms do not know their productivity or caliber. To learn them, they
have to pay a ﬁxed entry cost fe > 0. Once they pay this cost, they draw ϕ and ξ from a bivariate
probability distribution with density v(ϕ,ξ) > 0 on the support [0,ϕ] × [0,ξ]. There is free entry
into the industry. Firms pay fe to learn their productivity and caliber only if the expected post-







Πd (ϕ,ξ,P)v(ϕ,ξ)dξdϕ = fe. (11)
Equation (11) is the condition for industry equilibrium. Solving for P in a closed form would require
assuming a particular shape of the bivariate distribution v(ϕ,ξ). We prefer not to make such an
assumption and keep the analysis general. In Appendix 1(i), we demonstrate that a solution for P
in equation (11) exists and is unique.
Once P is determined, we can solve for the equilibrium prices, quality levels, revenues, proﬁts,










can be written as aggregating across productivity and (surviving) caliber levels rather than across

















η(ϕ,ξ)h(ϕ,ξ)dξdϕ is the (weighted) average ability of surviving ﬁrms. Solving for
13This property stems from the fact that the two components of the proﬁt function, Π0 (λ) and F(λ), are particular
cases of the polynomial form aλ
b. Thus, their ratio is proportional to the ratio of their derivatives. As a result, ﬁxed
c o s t sa r eo p t i m a l l yc h o s e nt ob ep r o p o r t i o n a lt oo p e r a t i v ep r o ﬁts, which implies that they are also proportional to
revenue and post-entry proﬁts.




α0 e η−1. Since the right-hand-side of this equation is increasing in P,i n
equilibrium tougher market competition is associated with a larger number of entrants.
2.2 The open economy with unconstrained export quality
To benchmark our full model, in this section we examine the open-economy equilibrium in a two-
country world economy where export quality is unconstrained. Our analysis focuses on the equilib-
rium cross-sectional conﬁguration of ﬁrm characteristics within a country rather than on diﬀerences
across countries or the eﬀects of trade liberalization. We ﬁnd that, as in the closed economy, in
this “unconstrained” open-economy case the model can also be collapsed into a model with only
one source of heterogeneity à la Melitz (2003).
The industry has the same structure in the foreign country as in the home country. However,
the foreign parameters F∗
0, c∗, f∗, f∗
e,a n dE∗ are allowed to diﬀer. The joint density function that
generates the productivity and caliber draws is v∗(ϕ,ξ) > 0,d e ﬁned on the support [0,ϕ] × [0,ξ].
The (endogenously determined) price aggregator is P∗. We describe the equilibrium in the home
country. The qualitative characteristics of the equilibrium in the foreign country are analogous.
In order to export, ﬁrms in the home and foreign countries need to pay ﬁxed exporting costs,
respectively fx and f∗
x, and iceberg transport costs τ. Firms need to decide whether to become
exporters or remain domestic. They choose to export if the marginal proﬁts they would make
in the foreign market outweigh the ﬁxed exporting costs. Exporters face CES demand in both
the domestic and the foreign markets and thus charge the same (factory gate) price at home and
abroad. The maximization problem in this case is analogous to that in the previous section, except
that here total demand (qw ≡ q+q∗) is the sum of domestic and foreign demand, and is determined
by qw = p−σλσ−1W,w h e r eW = E
P + τ−σ E∗
P∗. Exporter’s optimal quality, revenue, and proﬁts are




















α0 − F0 − fx. (13)
Equations (12) and (13) are analogous to equations (5) and (10), which still determine quality,
revenue and proﬁts for ﬁrms that do not export. In particular, η is also a summary statistic for ϕ
and ξ in the exporters’ revenue and proﬁt functions. Thus, iso-ability curves are also iso-revenue
curves and iso-proﬁtc u r v e s .
10Deﬁne as ∆uΠ ≡ Πu −Πd the diﬀerence in proﬁts between exporting and not exporting. Using







α0 > 0. Firms choose to export if ∆uΠ(η) ≥ 0. Setting ∆uΠ(η)=0and solving for
η, we obtain an export cut-oﬀ value, ηu, such that only ﬁrms with ability above this value export.













which satisﬁes ηu = η(ϕ,ξu(ϕ)).S i n c e η is constant along ξu(ϕ), this cut-oﬀ function is also an
iso-revenue curve and an iso-proﬁtc u r v e .
Figure 3 shows the equilibrium conﬁguration of ﬁrms in the open economy with unconstrained
export quality.14 Firms with caliber below ξ(ϕ) (η<η )e x i tt h em a r k e t . F i r m sw i t hc a l i b e r
between ξ(ϕ) and ξu(ϕ) (η ≤ η<η u) are active in the domestic market but do not export. Firms
with caliber above ξu(ϕ) (η ≥ ηu) sell domestically and also export.
Since rd(η), ru(η),a n d∆uΠ(η) are all monotone functions of η, ﬁrm size (revenue) is a perfect
predictor of export status. In particular, all ﬁrms smaller than rd(ηu) do not export while all ﬁrms
larger than ru(ηu) have positive foreign sales (no ﬁrm has sales between these two values). This
stark prediction of the unconstrained model can be represented in a graph showing the fraction of
exporters as a function of ﬁrm size. As Figure 4 shows, this fraction is a step function that jumps
from 0 to 1. This prediction, also common to all single-attribute models of ﬁrm heterogeneity,
implies that conditional on a given revenue level all ﬁrms have the same export status.
Finally, we note that quality decreases as we move down an iso-revenue curve. To see this,
consider iso-revenue curve ξk(ϕ),d e ﬁned so that ru(ϕ,ξk(ϕ)) = k.S o l v i n gf o rξ and substituting




α−α0 (B is a function of constant parameters).
2.3 The open economy with constrained export quality
A substantial amount of evidence suggests that success in foreign markets is associated with ﬁrms’
ability to attain high levels of product quality. Brooks (2006) ﬁnds that Colombian ﬁrms in sectors
with lower quality gaps relative to G-7 countries tend to export a larger fraction of their output.
Verhoogen (2008) ﬁnds that Mexican ﬁrms invest in quality upgrading in response to export op-
portunities created by the Peso devaluation. Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) ﬁnd that Mexican ﬁrms




α0 to ensure that ξ
u(ϕ) >ξ (ϕ).
11increase their average prices two years before they start exporting, which suggests a process of qual-
ity upgrading in preparation to export. Evidence of the existence of export quality requirements is
also provided by studies in international management. Using ﬁrm-level surveys in developed and
developing countries, these studies document ﬁrms’ need to upgrade quality as a crucial require-
ment to access foreign markets.15 Finally, policy-oriented research also emphasizes the existence
of quality requirements for exports as part of a broader concern about the impact of standards on
market access (World Bank 1999, WTO 2005, Maskus et al. 2005).
The potential motives for the existence of export quality constraints are various. First, higher
income countries tend to consume higher-quality goods (Hallak 2006, 2008) and therefore are likely
to set higher minimum quality standards. Firms that ship their products to higher income countries
should then ﬁnd those standards more stringent. Second, transportation costs are proportionally
higher for low-quality goods (Alchian and Allen 1964, Hummels and Skiba 2004). Therefore, below
some minimum quality threshold they can be prohibitive. Third, export quality requirements might
be related to management quality certiﬁcation (e.g. ISO 9000) which, due to its quality-signaling,
common-language, and conﬂict-setting properties, can alleviate the severe information asymmetry
problems under which international transactions are often conducted (Guler et al. 2002, Hudson
and Jones 2003, Terlaak and Kind 2006, Clougherty and Grajek 2008).
In our model, we capture the idea that entering the export market imposes more stringent
quality constraints by simply assuming that ﬁrms need to attain a minimum quality level to gain
access to the export market. We do not intend to uncover the particular source of these constraints
in this paper. Rather, our aim is to assess their common implications for the exporting behavior
of ﬁrms. Thus, we favor a modeling choice that, although very stylized, generates predictions that
are robust to the various potential sources of export quality constraints.
2.3.1 Characterization of the equilibrium
We examine the open-economy equilibrium in a two-country world economy with minimum export
quality requirements. Firms need to reach quality level λ to be able to export (the minimum is
λ∗ for foreign ﬁrms exporting to the home country). Except for the minimum export quality, the
“constrained” environment maintains all features of the unconstrained one. We keep our focus on
the cross-sectional conﬁguration of ﬁrm characteristics within a country.
15See Weston 1995 (U.S.), Erel and Ghosh 1997 (Turkey), Mersha 1997 (Africa), Anderson et al. 1999 (Canada
and U.S.), Corbett 2005 (9 mostly-developed countries).
12The equilibrium is represented in Figure 5. We describe its main features here and leave its
formal characterization to Appendix 2. As in the unconstrained equilibrium (see Figure 3), ﬁrms
below ξ(ϕ) do not survive (region I) while ﬁrms between ξ(ϕ) and ξu(ϕ) are only active in the
domestic market (region II). Similarly, ﬁrms with suﬃciently high combinations of ϕ and ξ are
(unconstrained) exporters (regions V.a and V.b). In the constrained equilibrium, however, there is
an e ws e to fﬁrms that would otherwise export with quality λu <λbut now are forced to choose
between upgrading their quality or not participating in the export market. Among those ﬁrms,
some refrain from investing and remain domestic (region III) while others upgrade quality and
export (region IV).
The curve ξu(ϕ) is no longer the export cut-oﬀ function. As ﬁrms’ unconstrained choice of
quality decreases along ξu(ϕ), quality is above the minimum requirement only on its left part —
where it coincides with the new export cut-oﬀ function — but drops below the minimum once it
reaches productivity ϕλ. Similarly, ﬁrms’ unconstrained quality choice is below the minimum for
all ﬁrms in the shaded areas delimited by ξu(ϕ) and the isoquality curve for λ, ξλ(ϕ).T h o s eﬁrms
would otherwise ﬁnd it proﬁtable to sell abroad but they are forced to upgrade quality if they wish
to export in the presence of the export quality requirement.16
In case ﬁrms in that area decide to export, they invest just enough to reach quality λ.T h u s ,
their marginal cost is c
ϕλβ and their price is pc(ϕ)= σ
σ−1
c
ϕλβ (subindex c denotes “constrained”




















λα − fx − F0 (15)
Since ξ does not aﬀect quality choice for constrained exporters, its value has no eﬀect on marginal
costs, prices, or revenues. However, it aﬀects proﬁts since attaining λ is less costly for ﬁrms
with higher caliber. Deﬁne ∆Πc ≡ Πc(ϕ,ξ) − Πd(ϕ,ξ). The export cut-oﬀ function ξx(ϕ) is now
implicitly deﬁned by ∆Πc(ϕ,ξx(ϕ)) = 0. This function cannot be solved in closed form. However,
in Appendix 2 we demonstrate that its slope is negative and it is located between ξu(ϕ) and ξλ(ϕ).
F i r m si nr e g i o nI I Iﬁnd that upgrading quality to satisfy the export requirement is too onerous.
In contrast, ﬁrms located in region IV invest in quality upgrade to meet the export requirement.
Those ﬁrms are the constrained exporters.
In the case of the foreign country the analysis is analogous. In Appendix 1(ii) we prove existence
16ξ
u(ϕ) can be thought of as the (hypothetical) export cut-oﬀ function for a single ﬁrm if the restriction were
removed only for that ﬁrm (removing it for all ﬁrms simultaneously would change P and hence shift ξ
u(ϕ)).
13and uniqueness of the equilibrium in this world economy.17
2.3.2 Firm size and export status
The presence of the minimum export quality requirements breaks the suﬃciency of η for predicting
ﬁrm total revenue (ﬁrm size). It also breaks the suﬃciency of revenue for predicting export status.
In Figure 6, we add three representative iso-revenue curves, r1,r 2, and r3, to the equilibrium
conﬁguration of ﬁrms displayed in Figure 5. Curves r1 and r2 represent families of iso-revenue curves
located, respectively, in region II and in the area below rx in region III. As in the unconstrained
case, along those curves the value of η is constant and all ﬁrms are domestic.
Iso-revenue curve r3 requires more careful analysis. Its upper-left portion is located in region
V. On this part of r3, ﬁrms export and have identical η. Since quality decreases along the curve,
at point A quality reaches the minimum level λ. Then, r3 goes straight down to point B,w h i c h
is located on ξ
x(ϕ).S i n c eϕ is constant on this segment and all ﬁrms produce quality λ, marginal
costs, price, and revenues are also equal. At point B there is a discontinuity in r3,w h i c hr e a p p e a r s
further to the right – in region III – as shown in the ﬁgure. This last portion of the iso-revenue
curve contains only domestic ﬁr m s ,w h i c ha t t a i nr e v e n u el e v e lr3 compensating their lack of exports
with more voluminous sales in the domestic market (due to their higher η). The limit case of this
set of iso-revenue curves is rx , the minimum possible revenue for an exporter.
In contrast to the predictions in the unconstrained case and of single-attribute models of ﬁrm
heterogeneity, the family of iso-revenue curves represented by r3 includes both exporters and non-
exporters. Therefore, for revenue levels in this family the fraction of exporters is strictly between 0
and 1. This prediction is consistent with the evidence presented in Figure 1.18 Revenue level (size)
is not suﬃcient to predict export status.
2.3.3 Testable predictions
In addition to explaining the existence of exporters and non-exporters of the same size, the model
also predicts systematic diﬀerences in quality and price. The following proposition establishes that,
for ﬁrms on the same iso-revenue curve, exporters produce higher quality than non-exporters.
17Setting λ = λ
∗ =0 , the proof also demonstrates equilibrium existence and uniqueness for the unconstrained case.
18In general the fraction of exporters need not be monotonically increasing in revenue. Monotonicity, however, can
be proved for a bivariate uniform distribution for v(ϕ,ξ) (proof available upon request).
14Proposition 1. Conditional on size (total revenue), quality is higher for exporters than for do-
mestic ﬁrms:
∀r, λx(ϕx,ξ x)|rx=r >λ d(ϕd,ξ d)|rd=r,x = {u,c} (16)
For r<r x, this proposition is vacuous since none of the ﬁrms exports.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
This result can be veriﬁed by visual inspection of Figure 6. Exporters are either ﬁrms located
between points A and B, in which case they produce quality λ,o rﬁrms located above A,i nw h i c h
case they produce quality above λ. Instead, non-exporters are located to the right of C, and thus
produce quality below λ. Exporters are ﬁrms with relatively high caliber and low productivity
while non-exporters are ﬁrms with low caliber but high productivity.
Since quality is unobservable, our empirical investigation relies on corollaries to proposition 1.
Corollary 1 states that, holding size constant, exporters charge higher prices than non-exporters:
Corollary 1. Conditional on size, exporters charge higher prices than domestic ﬁrms
∀r, px(ϕx,ξ x)|rx=r >p d(ϕd,ξ d)|rd=r,x = {u,c} (17)
Proof. With CES demand, ri = piqi = p1−σ
i λσ−1
i Si,w h e r eSi = E
P if i = d and Si = W if






i . On the same iso-revenue curve, rx = rd.
Then, since W>E
P and λx >λ d (proposition 1), corollary 1 easily follows. QED
Proposition 1 is the basis of our empirical investigation. Corollary 1 is the main testable
prediction. The predictions of conditional (on size) exporter premia we obtain here are novel.
Models of ﬁrm heterogeneity with quality diﬀerentiation predict unconditional exporter premia
for quality and price (Baldwin and Harrigan 2007, Johnson 2008, Verhoogen 2008, Kugler and
Verhoogen 2008). However, those models do not predict exporter premia holding size constant,a s
they cannot account for variation in export status among ﬁrms of equal size in the ﬁrst place.
So far we have assumed that ﬁxed and variable production costs increase with quality, leaving the
source of those costs unmodeled. An ap r i o r iappealing rationale is the presumption that producing
higher quality goods requires more skilled-labor-intensive and more capital-intensive techniques. In
that case, exporters, who produce higher quality than non-exporters — conditional on size — will
also pay higher average wages and have a higher capital-to-labor ratio.19 In Appendix 4, we provide
19Exporters will also pay higher average wages if quality production requires paying eﬃciency wages.
15a background model of the deeper fundamentals that might drive a positive relationship between
quality and ﬁxed and variable costs using an approach that partially draws on Verhoogen (2008).
That relationship, combined with proposition 1, delivers the following additional results:
Corollary 2. Conditional on size, exporters pay higher average wages than non-exporters
Proof. See Appendix 4.
Corollary 3. Conditional on size, exporters are more capital intensive than non exporters
Proof. See Appendix 4.
Finally, proposition 1 and corollaries 1, 2 and 3 can be weakened to be stated in expected values.
We take these predictions to the data in this last form.20
3D a t a
3.1 Data sources
Our empirical analysis utilizes establishment-level manufacturing survey data from India, the U.S.,
Chile and Colombia. Because our theory hinges on a diﬀerentiated-product demand structure,
following Rauch’s (1999) classiﬁcation we focus on industries manufacturing those products in our
baseline analysis. We discuss the data sources brieﬂyb e l o w ;m o r es p e c i ﬁc description of data
sources, data cleaning, and concordances is provided in the Data Appendix.
For India, we use a cross-section of the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), conducted by the
Central Statistical Organization, for the year 1997-98. In addition to establishment-level informa-
tion (classiﬁed by 4-digit NIC categories), this survey also includes more disaggregate information
on output quantities and values at the product level, which allows us to construct product level
prices (unit values). Also, it has information on whether plants have obtained ISO 9000 certiﬁ-
cation, which can be used as a direct proxy for quality. The ASI covers all registered industrial
establishments (formal sector) employing more than 20 persons, divided into a “census” sector
20Another potentially testable prediction, which diﬀers from those of single-attribute models of ﬁrm heterogeneity,
is that trade liberalization should induce a reshuﬄing of size rankings in favor of ﬁrms with high caliber. Thus, ﬁrm
size in the closed economy does not perfectly predict size or export status in the open economy. For example, consider
an iso-revenue curve in Figure 6 that crosses regions III, IV, and V in autarky. Following trade liberalization, ﬁrms
lying in regions IV and V of the curve would choose to export and hence expand, whereas those in region III would
remain domestic. We leave the empirical analysis of this prediction for further research.
16and a “sample” sector.21 All factories in the census sector (employing more than 100 workers or
located in designated backward areas) are surveyed. Factories in the sample sector are stratiﬁed
and randomly sampled. Throughout our analysis, we appropriately adjust for sampling weights
(called “multipliers”).
For the US, we use data from the 1997 Census of Manufactures (CMF) collected by the US
Census Bureau.22 The CMF includes detailed information on establishment inputs and outputs
classiﬁed at the 4-digit SIC level. Although it covers all manufacturing establishments that employ
at least one paid worker, data for most small plants are collected from administrative records
(“AR plants”). Because many variables for AR plants are imputed rather than directly collected,
following the practice in the literature (e.g. Foster et al. 2008) we exclude them from our analysis.
A distinctive feature of this paper with regard to CMF data is the use of seven-digit SIC product-
speciﬁc information to derive product-level unit values (or prices).23 One drawback of using unit
values is that quantity data is unavailable for a large fraction of establishments and products.
However, since our model’s predictions relate to comparisons across establishments (ﬁrms) within
industries, lack of information for entire products or industries should not bias our results.
We use manufacturing census for Chile and Colombia only to examine exporter premia in
average wage and capital intensity as those datasets do not include product-level information. For
Chile, we use the annual Chilean manufacturing census, which covers all manufacturing plants with
more than 10 employees. We use data for the years 1991-96, the only period with available data on
export activity. For Colombia, we use the Colombian manufacturing census for the years 1981 to
1991. The Colombian census also covers all plants with 10 or more employees. Both the Chilean
and Colombian censuses classify establishments at the 4-digit ISIC level.24
3.2 Deﬁnition of variables and summary statistics
Testing the predictions of our theoretical model requires data on export status, revenue, potential
proxies for quality, output price, average wage, and capital intensity (capital to labor ratio).25
Ideally, we would like to have a measure of quality that is directly consistent with λ in our
21The limit is lower (10 employees) for plants that use electric power for production.
22We also use the 1992 CMF for robustness checks.
23Foster et al. (2008) use unit values at the 7-digit level derived from the CMF for a small set of speciﬁcp r o d u c t s .
24Further details about these datasets can be found in Sivadasan (2007) for India, the LRD technical documentation
manual (Monahan 1992) for the U.S., and Roberts and Tybout (1996) for Chile and Colombia.
25In Section 5, as part of our robustness checks, we deﬁne and discuss a number of other variables.
17model. While this ideal measure is unavailable, in the Indian dataset each plant reports if it has
obtained ISO 9000 certiﬁcation. We discuss in section 4.3 why the ISO 9000 quality management
certiﬁcation could be a good proxy for quality (λ).
All variables, except for price, are deﬁned at the establishment level. Export status is captured
by a dummy variable deﬁned to equal one for establishments reporting positive exports. Revenue
is total sales. Labor is total employment and average wage is the ratio of total wages to total
employment. Capital, in the case of Chile, is constructed using the perpetual inventory method.
For India, the U.S., and Colombia, capital is measured as reported total ﬁxed assets. The well-
deﬁned ownership links available in the U.S. dataset allows us to aggregate establishments into
ﬁrms and thus perform robustness analysis deﬁning variables at the ﬁrm level.
For India and the U.S., a product price is its unit value, computed as the ratio of output value
to output quantity. While price information is available for each product line - so there are multiple
price observations per establishment - data on export value are reported only at the establishment
level. In our baseline analysis, we assume exporters export all their product lines. However, we
also check robustness to alternative assumptions about which product lines are exported.
Panels 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Table 1 present summary statistics for establishments in “diﬀerentiated”
sectors in our ﬁnal samples for India, the U.S., Chile and Colombia, respectively. The fact that price
data are not available for all establishments and product lines is evident from the lower number of
product-level price observations than of establishment-level observations for other variables despite
many establishments having multiple products.
Since our analysis focuses on diﬀerences between exporters and non-exporters within industries,
we exclude industries with no exporters from our sample. Hence, the fraction of exporters that
can be inferred from the table is likely to overestimate the prevalence of exporting in the full sam-
ple. Subject to this caveat, for India exporters account for 26% of product-level price observations
(1,681/6,494), 20% of establishment-level observations with average wage and capital intensity in-
formation, and 18% of establishment-level observations with information on ISO 9000 adoption.
For the US, exporters account for 27% of price observations and 21% of wage and capital obser-
vations. The higher prevalence of exporting in the sample of product prices than in the sample of
establishments is due to our assumption that an exporting establishment exports all product lines,
coupled with the fact that larger ﬁrms, who are more likely to export, are also more likely to have
multiple product lines. Finally, exporters account for 21% of establishment-year observations in
Chile and 13% in Colombia.
18To mitigate the inﬂuence of outliers, all variables are wi n s o r i z e db y1 %o nb o t ht a i l so ft h e
distribution. For reasons discussed later, in our baseline analysis we standardize all variables (except
dummies), by subtracting industry means and dividing by industry standard deviations. When
using price data, “industries” are product codes. Thus, means and standard deviations reported in
Table 1 correspond to standardized variables.26 The unconditional mean of (standardized) prices is
higher for exporters than for non-exporters in both India (panel 1) and the U.S. (panel 2). Panel 1
also shows that ISO 9000 certiﬁcation in India is much more common among exporters (17%) than
among non-exporters (3%). Finally, in all four panels, the overall mean values for average wage
and capital intensity are higher for exporters than for non-exporters.
4 Empirical analysis
This section tests the theoretical predictions of the model. In section 4.1 we describe our estimation
strategy. In section 4.2 we test corollary 1, which is the model’s main testable prediction. In section
4.3, we exploit information on ISO 9000 certiﬁcation available for Indian establishments, using it
as a proxy for quality to test proposition 1. In section 4.4, we test corollaries 2 and 3.
4.1 Estimation strategy
In equilibrium, price, quality, revenue, capital intensity, average wage, and export status are jointly
determined as functions of the exogenous ability draws, ϕ and ξ. Proposition 1 and corollaries 1,
2, and 3 all impose restrictions on conditional expectations derived from that joint distribution.
Deﬁning an indicator variable for export status, D, we can write the weak versions of proposition
1 and the corollaries as








To test the above predictions, we assume that the conditional expectations take the linear
separable form: E [Y |r,D]=gY (r)+δY D,w h e r egY (r) is a ﬂexible control for size and δY is the
conditional exporter premium. Given this assumption, a realization of the dependent variable can
be expressed as
y = gY (r)+δY D + u (19)
26All our speciﬁcations using panel data from Chile and Colombia include industry/year ﬁxed eﬀects. Thus, since
nominal variables (capital intensity and wage) enter regressions in logarithms, our results are invariant to deﬂating
them using industry level deﬂators.
19where u is a random component uncorrelated with the conditioning variables. In our case, u
captures variation in the dependent variable across ﬁrms that have the same revenue and export
status but diﬀerent ϕ and ξ. We estimate (19) using a linear regression framework. It is worth
noting that the coeﬃcients in equation (19) do not capture causal relationships. In particular, the
exporter premium δY should be interpreted as the diﬀerence in the expected value of Y when we
compare an exporter and a non-exporter of equal size.
Although our model and its predictions are essentially relevant to a single industry, we pool
observations in all diﬀerentiated-products industries to estimate equation (19). We address the
potential impact of industry heterogeneity in two ways. First, in our empirical implementation
we allow the coeﬃcients of the polynomial gY (r) to vary by industry. Thus, the constant in the
polynomial becomes an industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect (note that “industries” are deﬁned at the
product-code level for testing corollary 1). Also, to ﬂexibly capture non-linearities, we specify both
a parametric (a third order polynomial) and a semi-parametric (industry-speciﬁcs i z ed e c i l eﬁxed
eﬀects) form for gY (r). In contrast to the coeﬃcients of the size control function, we restrict the
coeﬃcient on the export dummy to be constant — but later relax this restriction by interacting the
export dummy with various product characteristics. Second, we standardize both the dependent
and the independent variables using industry-speciﬁc means and standard deviations to improve
comparability across sectors. In particular, standardization prevents particular industries from
driving the overall results.27 Nevertheless, we also check robustness to using non-standardized
variables.
4.2 Price results
Since quality is not directly observable, the model’s main testable result is corollary 1, which
predicts a positive conditional exporter premium for price (δp > 0). In this section, we test this
prediction using manufacturing data for diﬀerentiated products in India and the United States.
As explained in section 3.2, we measure price with unit values per product line. For multiprod-
uct establishments, we include one price observation per line of diﬀerentiated product but maintain
establishment revenues as our measure of size. Also, since information on exports is not disaggre-
27As an illustration, consider measuring the relative price charged by exporters using data from two industries
with equal number of ﬁrms. Suppose in industry 1 exporters price at a premium of 40% relative to non-exporters,
while in industry 2 exporters price at a discount of 10%. If we use non-standardized prices we obtain a mean export
price premium of 15%. This ﬁgure could be misleading if the price premium in industry 1 is low relative to the price
dispersion in that industry while in industry 2 the price discount is high relative to the price dispersion.
20gated by product line, in our baseline analysis we assume that an establishment exports all of its
product lines. To allow for arbitrary correlation between error terms for a given establishment, we
cluster standard errors at the establishment level.
Table 2 presents the results of estimating equation (19) with price as the dependent variable.
Each entry in the table displays the estimate of the exporter premium, δp, in the indicated speciﬁ-
cation. The ﬁrst two columns mainly serve as benchmark. In column 1, we include only product-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects and no controls for size while in column 2 we include a product-speciﬁcs i z e
polynomial of order 2. Columns 3 and 4 are our baseline (preferred) speciﬁcations. In column
3, we include a product-speciﬁc polynomial of order 3. In column 4, we include product-speciﬁc
size-decile ﬁxed eﬀects. Panel 1 presents results for India; panel 2 presents results for the U.S.. In
each panel, row 1 (row 2) displays results using standardized (non-standardized) variables.
The table shows a positive conditional exporter price premium in all speciﬁcations. For India,
all standardized speciﬁcations yield a statistically signiﬁcant premium for exporters. In the non-
standardized case, the premium is not statistically signiﬁcant in columns 1 and 2, but it is larger
and signiﬁcant in the baseline speciﬁcations of columns 3 and 4, where size is ﬂexibly controlled for.
In those speciﬁcations the standardized price premium is 17.7% and 16.9%, respectively. For the
U.S., the estimated price premium is statistically signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. In particular, the
standardized price premium in the baseline speciﬁcations is 13.6% and 13.5%. These results conﬁrm
the main testable prediction of our model: exporters charge higher prices than non-exporters
conditional on size.
We note that conditional exporter price premium regressions have been estimated in the liter-
ature (e.g. Fajnzylber and Fernandes 2006, Iaccovone and Javorcik 2008, Kugler and Verhoogen
2008) although lacking a theoretical framework under which the results could be properly inter-
preted. In fact, size summarizes all relevant information about a ﬁrm under single-attribute models.
Thus, those models predict that once size is controlled for the exporter premium should be zero
(δp =0 ). We interpret the positive conditional premia typically found by this literature as further
empirical support for the predictions of our model.
Our baseline sample includes only diﬀerentiated products, which are those that most closely
match the assumptions of the model. As a check that our theory applies primarily to diﬀerentiated
products, we implement our empirical strategy also on non-diﬀerentiated products (homogeneous
and reference-priced), where it is less obvious that the theory should apply. The results are pre-
sented in Table 3. The conditional exporter price premium is higher for diﬀerentiated goods in
21both countries. In India, the premium is large and statistically signiﬁcant for diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts, but insigniﬁcant (and negative) in the sample of homogenous products. In the U.S., even
though there is still a price premium for homogeneous good exporters, the premium for exporters
of diﬀerentiated goods is higher. These results justify our focus on diﬀerentiated products.
We perform several robustness checks. The results are available in Table A.1 of the appendix.
First, we redeﬁne the export dummy as equal to one only for those ﬁrms with export sales above 2%
of total revenue. For India, the magnitude and signiﬁcance of the export premium in the baseline
speciﬁcations is slightly lower. For the U.S., magnitude and signiﬁcance are mostly unchanged.
Second, we retain only the largest product line for each establishment to check robustness to the
possibility that establishments export their main line of products but not subsidiary product lines.
For India, the export premium has the same magnitude and is statistically signiﬁcant when we
control for a cubic function of size (column 3). It is positive but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero when we control for size with size decile dummies. For the U.S. the results follow closely those
of the baseline speciﬁcation in all cases.
In a number of other (unreported) robustness checks, we found results robust to: (a) using
diﬀerent winsorization cutoﬀs (including no winsorization) for the price variable; (b) excluding
products whose deﬁnition includes the terms NEC or NES (“Not Elsewhere Classiﬁed/Speciﬁed”)
for India, and excluding product codes ending with 0 or 9 for the U.S.; (c) for India, excluding
products measured in “numbers” because of potential heterogeneity in units (e.g. diﬀerent pack
sizes), and for the US excluding potential non-manufacturing product codes (i.e. ﬁrst digit not 2
or 3); and (d) examining the subset of product codes with available price data for all occurrences
and also with at least 25 observations to ensure that results are not driven by missing observations
within product codes.
One ﬁnal concern is that our results could be spurious if ﬁrms charge higher mark-ups in the
export market than in the domestic market. However, the available empirical evidence shows just
the opposite. Das et al. (2007) use a structural model to estimate the ratio of foreign to domestic
demand elasticities in three manufacturing industries in Colombia. They ﬁnd demand elasticities
in the foreign market to be almost twice as large as in the domestic market in two sectors, and
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the remaining sector. Aw et al. (2001) compare export and domestic
prices charged by the same ﬁrm on the same product in the Taiwanese electronics industry in 1986
and 1991. Out of 54 product/years they investigate, they ﬁnd higher domestic prices in 40 cases
(8 signiﬁcant) and negative domestic prices in 14 cases (none signiﬁcant).
224.3 ISO 9000 quality proxy results
Even though we do not have direct measures of product quality, an extensive literature suggests
that ISO 9000 certiﬁcation may be a good proxy for it, particularly in the context of our model.
First, ISO 9000 certiﬁcation is correlated with direct measures of product quality (e.g. Brown et
al. 1998, Withers and Ebrahimpour 2001). Second, consistent with our modeling assumption that
upgrading quality is costly but shifts demand out, Guler et al. (2002) document that obtaining
ISO 9000 involves a considerable monetary investment (about $125,000) and time eﬀort (about nine
months to two years), and impacts both local and international demand as a number of governments
and private companies (particularly MNCs) require this certiﬁcation from suppliers. There is also
evidence that the certiﬁcation helps improve measures of customer satisfaction (Buttle, 1997).28
Results from estimating equation (19) with ISO 9000 certiﬁcation as the dependent variable are
presented in Table 4. Since the dependent variable is a dummy, we do not use the standardized
speciﬁcation here. Also, the unit of observation here i st h ee s t a b l i s h m e n ts i n c eo n l ya tt h a tl e v e l
do we have information on ISO 9000 adoption. Accordingly, the size controls vary at the 4-digit
industry level rather than at the product level. Consistent with the predictions of proposition 1,
we ﬁnd that exporters are much more likely to obtain ISO 9000 certiﬁcation, conditional on size.
4.4 Wage and factor intensity results
In this section, we test corollaries 2 and 3 by examining conditional exporter premia in (log) average
wage and capital intensity (measured as the log ratio of capital to labor). For brevity, for each
of the four countries, we only present the preferred speciﬁcations with the cubic and size-decile
controls for size. As in the previous section, the unit of observation is the establishment. For each
dependent variable, the ﬁrst row presents results using standardized variables while the second row
presents results using non-standardized ones.
Table 5 shows that the conditional exporter premium for average wage is signiﬁcantly positive
for all countries in both speciﬁcations. In the standardized case, the estimated exporter premia in
columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 imply a 13.6% of standard deviation exporter wage premium in India, 9.7%
in the U.S., 13.1% in Chile and 9.2% in Colombia. The results in row 2 using the non-transformed
variables are similar.29
28Verhoogen (2008) also uses ISO 9000 certiﬁcation as a proxy for quality.
29Though wage rates better capture unobserved worker ability, we also analyzed the share of non-production workers
in the total wage bill. This share is signiﬁcantly higher for exporters in the U.S., Chile and Colombia but statistically
23Next, we examine the empirical validity of Corollary 3. For India, Chile and Colombia, the
results in rows 3 and 4 of Table 4 show a positive and signiﬁcant conditional exporter premium in
capital intensity in both speciﬁcations. For example, the estimation using standardized variables
and the most ﬂexible control for size indicate that exporters in India have 18.8% (of standard
deviation) higher log capital to worker ratio, conditional on revenue. The corresponding premium
is 25.0% for Chile and 14.7% for Colombia.
The results for the U.S. are diﬀerent. Conditional on size, capital intensity appears to be lower
for exporters than for non-exporters. Given that this result is at odds with results previously
reported in the literature using similar speciﬁcations (e.g. Bernard and Jensen 1999), we perform
the same estimation using Census data for 1992 rather than 1997 (results are presented in Appendix
Table A.3). We ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant (almost zero) premium on capital intensity in the 1992 data.
In contrast, the 1992 results for average wage and price are very consistent with the 1997 results.
Given the non-robustness of the capital intensity results for the U.S. across years, we are cautious
about adopting any particular interpretation for the negative premium in 1997 and leave it for
further scrutiny in future research.30
Note that these corollaries combine proposition 1 with ancillary assumptions about factor use
of quality production. Thus, rejection of the corollaries need not imply rejecting proposition 1.
Nevertheless, the evidence of this section as a whole supports both that proposition and the impli-
cations of our model for factor usage. Conditional on ﬁrm size, exporters hire more skilled workers
(as reﬂected in higher average wages) and, except for the U.S., are more capital intensive.
5 Robustness to alternate models
In this section we evaluate the robustness of our results to alternate models. In section 5.1, we focus
on single-attribute models of ﬁrm heterogeneity and address the possibility that the conditional
exporter premia we ﬁnd are merely driven by measurement error. In section 5.2, we address
robustness against alternate multi-attribute models.
insigniﬁcant for India. Looking at the purely physical measure of non-production worker share of employment, we
found a higher share for exporters in the U.S. and Colombia, but a statistically insigniﬁcant premium for India and
Chile. These results are reported in Appendix Table A.2.
30One hypothesis could be that quality upgrading requires increasing the intensity of capital in labor-abundant
countries where production methods are relatively intensive in unskilled labor (e.g. need of machinery to improve
cutting precision) but requires increasing the intensity of skilled labor in capital-abundant countries where production
methods are already intensive in the use of capital (e.g. need of artisan “touches”).
245.1 Robustness to single-attribute models
Our results show systematic diﬀerences between exporters and non-exporters conditional on size.
In fact, empirical studies consistently ﬁnd positive conditional (on size) exporter premia in price,
average wages, and capital intensity.31 As discussed in section 4.2, those results are at odds with
the predictions of single-attribute models, which are in general — explicitly or implicitly — the
theoretical framework underlying those studies. In any event, since ﬁrm size and export status are
correlated variables, measurement error in the size control variable could lead to a spurious ﬁnding
of a positive conditional exporter premium even when the true premium is zero. We address this
concern in three ways.
First, we alternatively use employment as the measure of ﬁrm size. As Kugler and Verhoogen
(2008) argue, sales may be measured with error, especially in developing countries such as India,
for reasons related to avoidance of excise and income taxes, which are less likely to bias mea-
surement of employment. Since, like revenue, employment is monotonically related to ﬁrm size in
single-attribute models, it can be used as alternative size control to test those models as the null
hypothesis.32 The estimated exporter premia are presented in panel A of Table 6. Rather than
becoming smaller, as expected if due to measurement error, the estimated magnitudes increase.
Second, a source of error in the size measure could arise from the fact that we use establishment
size rather than ﬁrm size in our analysis. This measure of size could be inappropriate for multi-
establishment ﬁrms if the heterogeneous attributes and the ﬁxed costs are determined at the ﬁrm
level. Exploiting information on ownership links available in the U.S. Census Longitudinal Business
Database — but not in the other three datasets — we aggregate establishments up to the ﬁrm level
and re-estimate our baseline speciﬁcation. Panel 1 of Appendix Table A.4 shows that the results
are robust to the use of ﬁrm size as control. As an additional robustness check, in panel 2 we repeat
the analysis using only single-establishment ﬁrms. The baseline results are robust to this check as
well.
Third, we exploit the panel nature of the data for Chile and Colombia to control for transitional
shocks to revenue. For each establishment, we form four year means for the dependent variables
(average wage and capital intensity) and revenue over the latest available data period — 1993-96
31Section 4.2 references empirical evidence on conditional exporter premia in price. For evidence on conditional
premia in wages and capital intensity, see Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Bernard et al. (2007).
32Our model indicates that we should use revenue as size control. Thus, while using employment is appropriate to
test single-attribute models as the null, under our framework as null it could yield biased estimates.
25for Chile and 1988-91 for Colombia (we exclude ﬁrms that enter or exit export status during the
period to avoid transitional dynamics). The results, presented in Appendix Table A.5, conﬁrm the
baseline results.
5.2 Robustness to alternate multi-attribute models
Our paper proposes a multi-attribute model in which ﬁrms are heterogeneous in productivity and
caliber. In this section, we evaluate the relevance of this characterization of ﬁrms’ heterogeneity to
explain our results against alternate multi-attribute models. We follow two diﬀerent but comple-
mentary strategies. In section 5.2.1, we analyze the extent to which other speciﬁc multi-attribute
models, some explicitly proposed in the literature, can explain the facts we document here. In
section 5.2.2, we identify industries where the economic mechanisms we emphasize are more likely
to operate and evaluate whether the predictions of our model hold more strongly in those industries
than in others.
5.2.1 Evaluation of speciﬁc alternate multi-attribute models
Several multi-attribute models have been proposed in the literature. Although in general built to
explain other implications of ﬁrm heterogeneity, we can evaluate whether they can also account
f o ro u rr e s u l t s . T h em o s tc o m m o no n ei sa model that combines productivity diﬀerences à la
Melitz (2003) with heterogeneous ﬁxed or sunk export costs (Das et al., Ruhl 2008, Eaton et al.
2008, Armenter and Koren 2009).33 Under this framework, less productive exporters might be of
equal size as more productive non-exporters if the former have lower export costs. In that case,
the exporters’ lower productivity would imply that they charge higher prices. While this model
can explain conditional exporter price premia, it cannot explain why exporters pay higher wages,
use capital more intensively, or are more likely to acquire ISO 9000 certiﬁcation. Alternatively,
combining Kugler and Verhoogen’s (2008) framework (rather than Melitz’) with heterogeneous
trade costs yields the opposite predictions, in particular exporters charge lower prices than non-
exporters, conditional on size. In either of these two cases, ﬁrms with equal productivity should
have equal sales volume in the domestic market. Thus, controlling for domestic sales rather than
total sales, we should not observe systematic diﬀerences between the prices domestic ﬁrms and
exporters charge. In panel B of Table 6, we see that this is not the case: exporters charge higher
prices even conditional on domestic sales.
33Heterogeneity in variable costs would work analogously.
26Ad i ﬀerent class of models introduces variation in products’ appeal across markets (e.g. Nguyen
2008, Demidova et al. 2008, Eaton et al. 2008, Bernard et al. 2009). While these models can
naturally explain the facts documented in Figure 1, they cannot explain the existence of systematic
conditional exporter premia, as documented here.
We could think of an alternative class of models in which ﬁrms are heterogeneous in their
productivity and in their access to ﬁnancial capital. While the predictions of such a model would
largely depend on assumptions about how ﬁnancial constraints aﬀect ﬁrm size and export status,
it is not a priori obvious that such a model would predict our facts. Nevertheless, we undertake
a crude test to check that heterogeneous access to ﬁnancing is not driving our results. Using the
measure of dependence on external ﬁnance proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1996), we exclude
products above the median for this measure and rerun the baseline price regressions. As the results
in panel 1 of Appendix Table A.6 show, the exporter premium is positive and signiﬁcant even in
the industries that are less dependent on external ﬁnance.
Finally, in addition to productivity ﬁrms could be heterogeneous in their access to government
oﬃcials. Then, large purely domestic ﬁrms could be those particularly able to secure government
contracts. If less productive ﬁrms produce lower quality and sell at lower prices as in Kugler
and Verhoogen (2008), heterogeneous access to government contracts might, in principle, explain
our results. To address this concern, we construct a product-level measure of dependence on
government purchases (fraction of output consumed by state and federal government) using detailed
input-output tables for the United States. Then, we run the baseline price regressions excluding
products above the median for this measure. Panel 2 of Appendix Table A.6 shows that the
exporter premium is positive and signiﬁcant even in industries that are relatively less dependent
on government purchases.
5.2.2 Channels: exploring sources of export quality constraints
A more general strategy for checking that our results are not driven by other multi-attribute
models is to investigate whether they are stronger in industries where the economic mechanisms we
emphasize are more likely to operate. In particular, since our model predicts conditional exporter
premia only in the presence of export quality constraints, we assess the relative strength of the
premia in industries more closely aﬀected by the sources of the constraints hypothesized in section
2.3, i.e. income per capita, distance to destination, and informational asymmetries. We wish
to stress that the data we use for this analysis is not ideal since, as we discuss below, we know
27export destinations at the country level but not at the ﬁrm level. Thus, the analysis here should be
construed as exploratory, more informative as a whole about the relevance of our model with export
quality constraints than about the particular source of the constraints. Details of data construction
and concordances are provided in the data appendix.
First, since export quality requirements could be related to the income per capita and distance
to destination markets, we would expect ﬁrms exporting to rich and/or distant countries to have a
higher quality, and hence price premium. Unfortunately, our data sets do not provide information
on ﬁrms’ exports by destination country. Thus, we test whether the exporter price premium is
higher for products sent on average, at the country level, to richer or to more distant countries.
To do that, we construct trade-weighted means of destination GDP per capita and destination
distance for each Indian and U.S. 4-digit SITC category and then interact them, standardized,
with the export dummy. Columns 1 to 4 of Table 7 display the results. In the case of India, the
coeﬃcients on both interactions are positive, as expected, but not statistically signiﬁcant. For the
U.S., the interaction terms are positive and signiﬁcant for both GDP per capita and distance.
Export quality constraints could also arise to solve informational asymmetry problems. In this
case, we would expect the export premium to be higher for more highly diﬀerentiated products,
which tend to be more complex and more diﬃcult to contract upon. We use estimates of elasticities
of substitution from Broda and Weinstein (2006) as a measure of product diﬀerentiation. This
measure, standardized, is interacted with the export dummy variable. The results are presented in
columns 5 and 6 of Table 7. For India, consistent with this idea we ﬁnd that the dummy interaction
is negative, signiﬁcantly so in the cubic speciﬁcation. For the U.S., the interaction is negative but
statistically insigniﬁcant.
Finally, columns 7 and 8 present results including all 3 interactions simultaneously. While in
general the estimated coeﬃcients on the interaction terms are not signiﬁcant, in all cases their sign
is consistent with the hypothesized source of the export quality constraint.
The evidence we present here suggests that all three hypotheses play some role as sources of
export quality constraints. However, further research using ﬁrm-level data with export destinations
is needed to pin down their relative importance.34 We take the analysis here as exploratory. As
a whole, the results are consistent with the mechanisms we emphasize and thus supportive of our
characterization of ﬁrms’ exporting behavior.
34The fact that it is not clear that one of these sources prevails over the others supports our choice of modeling the
export quality constraint in a simpliﬁed yet general form.
286C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we present a model of international trade with two dimensions of ﬁrm heterogeneity:
productivity and caliber. Quality choice is endogenous and a minimum threshold needs to be
attained in order to export. The model predicts conditional exporter premia for quality, price,
average wage and capital intensity, which we test using establishment-level data from India, the
U.S., Chile and Colombia. We ﬁnd strong support for the predictions of the model.
Our characterization of ﬁrms’ exporting behavior has important implications beyond what we
explore here. For example, while single-attribute models predict the largest ﬁrms to be the ones
to enter foreign markets in response to trade liberalization, our model predicts that many of those
large ﬁrms will be unwilling to pay the required quality-upgrading costs. Thus, the export response
to trade liberalization could be substantially lower than otherwise predicted. Similarly, the lack
of a one-to-one relationship between ﬁrm size and export status implies diﬀerent intensive-margin
versus extensive-margin export responses to changes in trade costs (e.g. Arkolakis 2008, Chaney
2008, Ruhl 2008) as export volumes of new entrants in the export market might largely exceed those
that cover the ﬁxed export costs. More generally, we hope our model can be used as an alternative
benchmark to evaluate, for example, the eﬀects of exchange rate ﬂuctuations, international price
movements, or trade liberalization.
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34Appendix 1: Equilibrium existence and uniqueness in the closed and open economies
i. Existence and uniqueness in the closed economy. Since Πd (ϕ,ξ,P) and ξ (ϕ,P) are continuous
and diﬀerentiable in P, Π(P) is also continuous and diﬀerentiable in P.B e c a u s eΠ(P) is continuous,
to demonstrate existence we only need to show that it takes the value fe at least once. Substituting
equations (8) and (9) into (11) it is easy to see that limP→0 Π(P)=∞ and limP→∞ Π(P)=0 .
This implies that there exists at least one value of P such that Π(P)=fe.
Since ∀(ϕ,ξ),
dΠd(ϕ,ξ,P)
dP < 0, application of Leibniz’s rule implies that
dΠ(P)
dP < 0,i . e .Π(P) is a
strictly decreasing function of P.T h e r e f o r e ,Π(P) takes the value fe only once. QED
ii. Existence and uniqueness in the open economy. To save notation, rename ϕ = e ϕ/c and ξ = e ξ/f,
letting e ϕ and e ξ denote the original productivity and caliber draws. Hence, ϕ and ξ combine
technology and input cost and can be interpreted as “cost-adjusted productivity and caliber”.






Π(ϕ,ξ,P,P∗)v(ϕ,ξ)dξdϕ, P > 0,P∗ > 0,
Π(ϕ,ξ,P,P∗)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0 if (ϕ,ξ) ∈ r(I)
Πd(ϕ,ξ,P) if (ϕ,ξ) ∈ {r(II),r(III)}
Πc (ϕ,ξ,P,P∗) if (ϕ,ξ) ∈ r(IV)
Πu (ϕ,ξ,P,P∗) if (ϕ,ξ) ∈ {r(V.a),r(V.b)}
where r(X) denotes region X = {I,II,III,IV,Va,Vb} as depicted in Figure 5 and Πd, Πu,a n dΠc
are respectively given by equations (8), (13), and (15). At the regions borders ﬁrms are indiﬀerent,
so Π(ϕ,ξ,P,P∗) does not jump. Thus, this function is continuous in (ϕ,ξ), though not diﬀerentiable
at the limits of integration — of measure zero in R2. The functions Πd, Πu,a n dΠc are continuous
and diﬀerentiable in P and P∗, as are also the limits of integration for each region. Therefore, the
continuity and diﬀerentiability of the function Π(P,P∗) in P and P∗ follows directly.
Since Π(ϕ,ξ,P,P∗) is continuous in (ϕ,ξ), by application of Leibniz rule we can ﬁnd the
derivatives of Π(P,P∗) with respect to P and P∗.S i n c e ∀(P,P∗,ϕ,ξ):∂Πi
∂P < 0,i= d,u,c,
∂Πi
∂P∗ < 0,i= u,c,
∂Πd(ϕ,ξ,P,P ∗)
∂P∗ =0 , and the derivatives of the limits of integration cancel out, we
can establish that ∀(P,P∗):
∂Π(P,P∗)
∂P < 0 and
∂Π(P,P∗)







∂P∗ < 0 in the foreign country.





We want to show that an equilibrium pair (P,P∗) exists and is unique. First, we make the following
assumption:
Assumption 1:
a.) limP→∞ Π(P,P∗) < limP→∞ Π
∗ (P,P∗)
b.) limP∗→∞ Π(P,P∗) > limP∗→∞ Π
∗ (P,P∗)
The two inequalities are analogous. When P →∞there are no proﬁts to be made in the
Home market so ﬁrms only operate in the Foreign market. Then, the ﬁrst inequality simply states
that Foreign ﬁrms’ expected proﬁts in the Foreign market — for any P∗ — are higher than Home
ﬁrms’ expected proﬁts in that market. Analogously, the second inequality states that Home ﬁrms’
expected proﬁts in the Home market are higher than Foreign ﬁrms’ expected proﬁts there.
Proposition 2. : Under Assumption 1, there exists a unique pair (P,P∗) that solves the system
of equations (20) and (21).
Since Π(P,P∗) is strictly decreasing in P∗, for any given P the value of P∗ that solves equation
(20) is unique and implicitly deﬁnes a function P∗ = P∗H
(P). Similarly, since Π(P,P∗) is strictly
decreasing in P, we can obtain the inverse function P = PH(P∗). Using the Implicit Function






∂Π(P,P∗)/∂P ∗ < 0. Analogously, equation (21) deﬁnes P∗ = P∗F









The existence proof is represented in Figure A.2. Assumption 1.a implies that











∗ (P,P∗) is decreasing in P∗,t h i s








Analogously, assumption 1.b implies that f∗















(P) are decreasing, (22) and (23) imply that these two curves must
cross at least once. Thus, an equilibrium exists.















¯. These derivatives are given by the following expressions:



















where the terms A>0,B > 0,C > 0, and D>0 are not displayed to conserve space. Using
simple algebra, is can be shown that the single property holds ∀(P,P∗). Thus, there is a unique
equilibrium. QED
Appendix 2: Formal characterization of the constrained equilibrium
The distinctive feature of the constrained equilibrium is the appearance of ﬁrms, in regions III
and IV, that face a binding export quality constraint.
The curve ξu(ϕ) is the solution to ∆uΠ(ϕ,ξu(ϕ)) = 0.A l o n gt h i sc u r v e ,ﬁrms’ unconstrained
choice of quality is monotonically decreasing in ϕ (see equation for λu in section 2.2). Thus, there is
av a l u e( ϕλ) at which this choice is exactly λ.35 From equations (12) and (13), we can easily verify
that both λu and ∆uΠ are increasing in ξ — conditional on ϕ. Hence, λu >λand ∆uΠ > 0 for
ﬁrms in region V.a. Since the export constraint does not bind for those ﬁrms, their export choice
is determined by the sign of ∆uΠ. Thus, they prefer to export.












This curve is also monotonically decreasing in ϕ. Comparing (24) with (14), we can check that the
two curves intersect at ϕλ and ∀ϕ>ϕ λ : ξλ(ϕ) >ξ u(ϕ).F i r m sl o c a t e da b o v eξλ(ϕ) spontaneously
satisfy the export quality requirement, so their export decisions are also governed by the sign of
∆uΠ.T h u s ,ﬁrms in region V.b, where ξ ≥ ξλ(ϕ) >ξ u(ϕ),a l s op r e f e rt oe x p o r t .
Firms located between ξu(ϕ) and ξλ(ϕ) are forced to upgrade quality if they wish to export.
Those that do it just attain quality λ. In section 2.3 we provide the expressions for marginal costs,
price, revenue and proﬁts for those constrained ﬁrms. We also deﬁne ∆Πc ≡ Πc(ϕ,ξ) − Πd(ϕ,ξ),




























35The expression for ϕλ can be obtained using equations (12) and (14) to solve for ϕ in λu(ϕ,ξ
u(ϕ)) = λ.
36The iso-quality curve is discontinuous at ϕλ. Its expression to the left of ϕλ is identical but for
E
P replacing W.
37T h ee x p o r tc u t - o ﬀ function ξx(ϕ) is implicitly deﬁned by ∆Πc(ϕ,ξx(ϕ)) = 0.S i n c e ∆Πc(ϕ,ξ)
is continuous and strictly increasing in its two arguments, by application of the implicit function
theorem, ξx(ϕ) is continuous and decreasing in ϕ. Its location is shown in the following lemma:
Lemma A.1. The export cut-oﬀ function ξx(ϕ) is ﬂanked by ξu(ϕ) and ξλ(ϕ):
∀ϕ>ϕ λ : ξλ(ϕ) >ξ x(ϕ) >ξ u(ϕ)
Proof.A s c o n s t r a i n e d ﬁrms are forced to deviate from their optimal (unconstrained) choice of
quality, Πc(ϕ,ξ) ≤ Πu(ϕ,ξ).T h i si m p l i e st h a t∆Πc(ϕ,ξu(ϕ)) < ∆Πu(ϕ,ξu(ϕ)) = 0.T h u s ,ﬁrms
located on ξu(ϕ) strictly prefer not to export. On the other hand, since the export restriction is
(just) not binding for ﬁrms located on ξλ(ϕ), ∆Πc(ϕ,ξλ(ϕ)) = ∆Πu(ϕ,ξλ(ϕ)) > 0. Therefore,
ﬁrms located along ξλ(ϕ) strictly prefer to export.
T h e s et w or e s u l t s ,t h ec o n t i n u i t yo f∆Πc(ϕ,ξ), and the fact that this function is strictly in-
creasing in ξ then imply that ∀ϕ>ϕ λ : ξu(ϕ) <ξ x(ϕ) <ξ λ(ϕ). QED
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 1
Consider an iso-revenue curve with at least an exporter and a non-exporter. For simplicity,
assume a suﬃciently high upper bound on the caliber support (ξ) so that there is an unconstrained
exporter on the curve whenever there is an exporter. Since both ﬁrms are on the same iso-revenue
curve rd(ηd)=ru(ηu).
Exporters need to satisfy the export quality constraint; therefore λu >λ . Comparing equations
(10) and (13), W>E / Pand rd(ηd)=ru(ηu) imply that ηd >η u. Since exporting is a choice,
∆uΠ(ηu) ≥ 0. The function ∆uΠ is increasing in η.T h u s ,ηd >η u implies that ∆uΠ(ηd) > 0.T h i s
last inequality means that the non-exporter would make positive marginal proﬁts in the export
market if unconstrained in his choice of quality, i.e. the reason for not exporting is that he does
not attain λ. Hence, λd <λ . QED
Appendix 4: Factor input requirements of quality production
Production requires the use of two primary factors, labor and capital. There are HL types
of labor, indexed by h =1 ,...H, which earn market-determined wages wL
h.T h e r e a r e a l s o HK
types of capital, indexed by h =1 ,...,H K,a n dV vintages of each type of capital, indexed by
38v =0 ,...,V − 1. A unit of capital of vintage v lasts v +1remaining periods. All vintages of the
same type of capital are perfect substitutes and equally productive. Therefore, they earn identical
market-determined rental rate wK
h . The price of a unit of capital of type h and vintage v is phv





ρt ,w h e r eρt = Πt
t0=0(1 + ρt0)
and ρt0 is the one period interest rate.
Denote by Lh the units of labor of type h,b yKh =
PV −1
v=0 Khv the units of capital of type h
hired by the ﬁrm, and deﬁne L =
P
h Lh and K =
P









K . Wages and rental rate gaps across
types of factor inputs can be thought to reﬂect diﬀerences in relative productivity in an unmodeled
“numeraire” industry. In the case of labor, relative productivity is assumed to depend on skills.
To produce quality λ,aﬁrm needs to pay average wage wL = wLλbL and average rental rate
wK = wKλbK, bL > 0, bK > 0,w h e r ewL and wK are the least expensive types of labor and capital,
respectively. This requirement applies to factor inputs associated both with ﬁxed and with variable
costs. Thus, producing higher quality requires hiring more skilled and higher-paid workers and
more expensive types of capital.
The quantity of output only depends on the quantity of inputs used in production, not on their
type. Output is produced using a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function:
Y = ϕLαLKαK,w h e r eαL + αK =1 . Combining this production function with the requirements

















, c = A
¡
wL¢αL ¡
wK¢αK,a n dβ = αLbL + αKbK.
Analogously, we assume that the ﬁxed cost part of quality production requires labor and capital
combined in a Cobb-Douglas production function with the same exponents: λ =( ξL0αLK0αK)
1/κ.
These costs can be thought of as expenses related to the implementation of quality control systems,
worker training, or product development.37 In addition, the ﬁrm incurs other ﬁxed costs F0 (such
as annual maintenance expenses or headquarter expenses) unrelated to quality. Accordingly, ﬁxed










37In this static framework, sunk and ﬁxed costs are equivalent. In a dynamic setting, sunk costs could still be
considered ﬁxed costs by converting them into an equivalent stream of per-period ﬁxed costs.
39where f = A
¡
wL¢αL ¡
wK¢αK and α = κ + αLbL + αKbK.38 These assumptions, together with the
results of proposition 1, yield Corollaries 2 and 3.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y2 . The assumption that average wages are monotonically increasing in quality,
combined with proposition 1, implies that
∀r, wL(λx(ϕx,ξ x))|rx=r >w L(λd(ϕd,ξ d))|rd=r.Q E D
Firm-level statistics do not report ﬁrms’ capital as a simple count of “machine units”. Instead,






Proof of Corollary 3. To demonstrate corollary 3, we ﬁrst substitute the pricing equation for capital









ρt . We assume that relative
prices of diﬀerent types of capital do not change over time: ∀h, wK
ht = υtwK
h .W ea l s oa s s u m et h a t ,
although ﬁrms’ composition of capital across types of capital goods diﬀers, it does not diﬀer across
vintages within types, i.e., ∀h, Khv = avKh,K h =
PV






















ρt . Variable costs are Cobb-Douglas, so cost shares are constant. Thus,
wKK
αK = wLL













Since ﬁxed costs are also Cobb-Douglas with identical coeﬃcients, equation (25) applies to those
costs as well. Thus, it also characterizes the capital intensity of the plant, i.e. including capital
and labor associated with both ﬁxed and variable costs.






> 0 if bL > 0. This result, combined with proposition 1,
immediately implies corollary 3.39 QED
38Note that α = κ + β. The assumption that α>(1 − β)(σ − 1) then implies that κ>σ (1 − β) − 1.
39Note that bL > 0 implies that β>0. Hence, while Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 hold even if quality does not
drive up marginal costs (β =0 ), this assumption is needed for quality to imply higher wages and capital intensity.
40Data Appendix
The Indian Manufacturing Survey dataset (ASI 1997-1998) uses the National Industrial Clas-
siﬁcation (NIC) 1987 revision. Each establishment is classiﬁed under a 4-digit NIC code. Thus,
establishment-level information, e.g. export status, wagebill, employment, and capital, is provided
at this level of aggregation. Product-level information for deriving unit values (shipment value and
quantity) is provided at the (5-digit) “item code” level. Unfortunately, item codes do not aggregate
up consistently to the 4-digit NIC classiﬁcation. We deﬁne “industries” at the 4-digit level and
“products” at the 5-digit item code level. After data cleaning — explained below — we are left with
323 4-digit NIC codes and 976 item codes. Establishments in the U.S. Census of Manufactures data-
base (CMF 1997) are classiﬁed under the 4-digit Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation 1987-revision
(SIC 87). Product information is provided at the 7-digit SIC level. We deﬁne “industries” and
“products” at the 4-digit and 7-digit SIC levels, respectively. After data cleaning, there are 467
4-digit SIC codes and 2,069 7-digit SIC codes.40 Finally, both the Chilean Manufacturing Census
(1991-1996) and the Colombian Manufacturing Census (1981-1996) use the 4-digit ISIC industry
classiﬁcation. After data cleaning, we are left with 77 industries in Chile and 88 in Colombia.
As part of our data cleaning process, we drop observations with missing data for our size
proxies (revenue and employment) or for variables required to form our dependent variables (capital
i n t e n s i t ya n da v e r a g ew a g e s ) . W h e nf o c u s i n go np rice information, we also drop products with
missing revenue or quantity information. Also, because we control for size using industry-speciﬁc
or product-speciﬁc polynomials of order 3, we exclude industries or products with less than 5
observations from our sample as well as those reporting no exporters. Further, to avoid the inﬂuence
of outliers, we winsorize all variables by 1% on both tails of the distribution (within each industry).
For India, we also drop codes for aggregate or miscellaneous categories (99920, 99930, and 99999)
and products measured in unspeciﬁed units (unit code 999). As discussed in the text, all our
analysis using the Indian dataset adjusts appropriately for sampling probabilities.
For India, price is deﬁned as the “ex-factory value” of goods manufactured divided by the
quantity manufactured. The “ex-factory value” excludes all distribution and transportation costs
associated with the sale of the manufactured products.41 For the U.S., product value of shipments
40While there is a total of about 13,000 distinct 7-digit product codes, quantity information is not available for
product lines that “are not meaningful” (Monahan, 1992).
41In the 1997-98 survey, data on transportation and other distribution costs was collected at the plant level and
then imputed to individual products in proportion to the gross sales value data collected for each product.
41is deﬁned as “net selling value, f.o.b. plant, of shipments, after discounts and allowances and
exclusive of freight charges and excise taxes”.
For various tests we perform, we need to concord our India and U.S. product-level data with
the 4-digit SITC classiﬁcation. For India, we construct a manual concordance between 5-digit item
codes and 4-digit SITC Rev.3 categories. For the U.S., we construct a manual concordance between
5-digit SIC Rev.1987 codes and 4-digit SITC Rev.2 categories. We also construct a mapping from
4-digit SITC Rev.3 codes to 4-digit SITC Rev.2 codes (Rev.3 → Rev.2) using the concordances
between 10-digit Harmonized System (HS) codes and those two classiﬁcations available at the the
Center for International Data (CID) website.42 Speciﬁcally, to map a given Rev.3 category into a
Rev.2 category, we ﬁrst identify all the 10-digit HS codes included in the ﬁrst category. Then, we
select the Rev.2 category into which most 10-digit HS codes are mapped. Thus, U.S. product codes
are also mapped to the Rev.2 classiﬁcation.
We also combine our data with other industry classiﬁcations as follows:
• Rauch’s classiﬁcation (RC). Rauch (1999) proposed a classiﬁcation of 4-digit SITC Rev.2
categories into three classes: “homogenous”, “reference-priced” and “diﬀerentiated” goods.
We use his “liberal” version. For products, we apply RC directly to our earlier mapping of
product codes into SITC Rev.2 categories. For the India dataset, we ﬁrst manually concord
3-digit NIC codes to the 3-digit ISIC classiﬁcation. Then, using a concordance between
the 3-digit ISIC classiﬁcation and the more disaggregate 4-digit SITC Rev.2 classiﬁcation,43
we deﬁne as “diﬀerentiated” any 3-digit ISIC code where more than half of 4-digit SITC
Rev.2 codes that match it are diﬀerentiated according to RC. For industries in the U.S.
dataset, 4-digit SIC codes are deﬁned as diﬀerentiated if more than half of 5-digit SIC codes
within a 4-digit SIC category are diﬀerentiated according to RC. For Chile and Colombia,
“diﬀerentiated” 3-digit ISIC categories are identiﬁed as done for India.
• Broda-Weinstein (BW) elasticity of substitution. These estimates are available at the 4-digit
SITC Rev.3 level.44 For India, they can be directly applied to product codes, which are
already mapped to that classiﬁcation. For the U.S. we ﬁrst map the elasticities to the 4-digit
SITC Rev.2 classiﬁcation using the Rev.3 → Rev.2 concordance described earlier.




42Rev.2 categories for 1997 was downloaded from the CID website. For India, we convert this
information into 4-digit SITC Rev.3 categories following our earlier concordance. Then, for
each Rev.3 category for India and Rev.2 category for the U.S. we construct the (average)
“destination GDP per capita” measure by weighting the GDP per capita of destination coun-
tries with the share of exports (CIF value) shipped to that destination. GDP per capita (in
constant year 2000 $) for 1997 comes from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
CD-ROM.
• Destination (average) distance. We follow the same procedure as outlined for destination
GDP per capita. Here, bilateral distance data (rather than GDP per capita data) comes
from the CEPII website.45
• Measure of external ﬁnancial dependence. The Rajan-Zingales measure of dependence on
external ﬁnance is available for 2-digit SIC 1987 categories. For India, we use the CID
concordance to map those categories into the 4-digit SITC Rev.3 classiﬁcation. The modal
2-digit SIC category is chosen as the unique match to any 4-digit SITC Rev.3 code. For the
U.S., 7-digit SIC product categories are directly mapped to their classiﬁcation.
• Measure of dependence on the government. The Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S.
provides Input-Output (I-O) matrices for 1997 based on a 5-digit IO classiﬁcation code.46
For India, we combine BEA’s IO-HS (10-digit) concordance with a HS-SITC (Rev.3) 4-digit
concordance from the CID website to obtain a 4-digit SITC Rev.3 I-O matrix. For the U.S.
we follow analogous procedure except for the use of a HS-SITC (Rev.2) 4-digit concordance to
obtain a 4-digit SITC Rev.2 I-O matrix. We form a measure of dependence on the government
as the ratio of total output consumed by the government to total output. For a handful of
product codes with missing data, we imputed the fraction of output used by government for




Figure 1:  Percentage of establishments that are exporters, by size quantiles 
The figures plot the fraction of exporters by 40 size (sales revenue) quantiles in sectors producing 
differentiated goods. Each establishment is assigned to one of 40 size quantiles within its 4-digit industry. 
Exporter fraction for a quantile is obtained by dividing the number of exporters in that quantile summed 
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Figure 4:  Fraction of exporters as a function of revenue in the unconstrained 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
Only differentiated sectors are included.  All variables (except the ISO 9000 dummy) are winsorized by 1% on both tails of the distribution and 
standardized using industry-specific means and standard deviations. In the case of price, “industries” are defined at the product level.   
 ALL  ESTABLISHMENTS  NON-EXPORTERS  EXPORTERS 
Description  N Mean  SD  N Mean  SD  N Mean  SD 
                   
Panel 1:  India (1998)                   
                   
Standardized (log) price   6,494   0.00  1.00  4,813   -0.01  0.96  1,681   0.06  1.05 
                   
Standardized (log) average wage rate  11,226  0.00  1.00  8,964 -0.09  0.96  2,262  0.50  1.02 
Standardized (log) capital intensity (capital/labor)  11,226  0.00  1.00  8,964 -0.08  0.99  2,262  0.43  0.90 
                   
ISO 9000 dummy   15,937   0.05   0.21    13,009   0.03   0.16    2,928   0.17   0.38  
                   
Panel 2:  USA (1997)            
                   
Standardized (log) price   49,203  0.00  1.00  35,772 -0.02  0.98  13,431  0.05  1.03 
                   
Standardized (log) average wage rate  123,079  0.00  1.00  96,670 -0.06  1.03  26,409  0.21  0.86 
Standardized (log) capital intensity (capital/labor)  123,079  0.00  1.00  96,670 -0.01  0.98  26,409  0.02  1.07 
                   
Panel 3:  Chile (1991-96)                   
                   
Standardized (log) average wage rate  17,053  0.00  1.00  13,446 -0.17  0.96  3,607  0.62  0.87 
Standardized (log) capital intensity (capital/labor)  17,053  0.00  1.00  13,446 -0.14  0.97  3,607  0.50  0.92 
                   
Panel 4:  Colombia (1981-91)                   
                   
Standardized (log) average wage rate  39,990  0.00  1.00  34,714 -0.11  0.94  5,276  0.73  1.06 
Standardized (log) capital intensity (capital/labor)  39,990  0.00  1.00  34,714 -0.07  0.99  5,276  0.43  0.89 
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Table 2: Log price: Baseline results  
 
All reported figures are coefficients on an exporter dummy which equals 1 if the establishment 
reports positive exports.  Price is defined as a unit value (product revenue/quantity). Standardized 
(log) price is (log) price demeaned by the product-specific mean and divided by the product-
specific standard deviation. Size is defined as log total sales of the establishment.  Standard errors 
are clustered at plant level; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  
   (1)   (2)   (3)  (4) 
         
Panel 1:  India (1997-98)         
         
Dependent variable: Log price (standardized)  0.112**  0.130**  0.177*** 0.169** 
  [0.050]  [0.060]  [0.063] [0.073] 
         
Dependent variable: Log price  0.0534  0.0502  0.0872** 0.113*** 
  [0.035]  [0.041]  [0.040] [0.042] 
         
Number of observations  6,494  6,494  6,494 6,494 
Number of products  296  296  296 296 
Number of plants  4,933  4,933  4,933 4,933 
      
Panel 2:  USA (1997)         
         
Dependent variable: Log price (standardized)  0.082***  0.131***  0.136*** 0.135*** 
  [0.018]  [0.019]  [0.019] [0.020] 
         
Dependent variable: Log price  0.030**  0.062***  0.067*** 0.066*** 
  [0.012]  [0.013]  [0.013] [0.014] 
      
Number of observations (plant-product)  49,203  49,203  49,203 49,203 
Number of products  860  860  860 860 
Number of plants  18,373  18,373  18,373 18,373 
         
Product  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes No 
Product-specific size polynomial (order 2)  No  Yes  No  No 
Product-specific size polynomial (order 3)  No  No  Yes  No 
Product-specific size-decile fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes 51 
Table 3: Log price: Results for differentiated and homogenous goods sectors 
 
All reported figures are coefficients on an exporter dummy which equals 1 if the establishment reports positive exports.  Price is defined as a unit 
value (product revenue/quantity). Standardized (log) price is (log) price demeaned by the product-specific mean and divided by the product-
specific standard deviation. Homogenous products include Rauch’s (1999) “homogeneous” and “reference-price” sectors (liberal version).  Size is 
defined as log total sales of the establishment. Standard errors are clustered at plant level; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant 




























    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Dependent variable:  Log price (standardized)  0.177***  0.169**  -0.0305  -0.0158 0.136***  0.135***  0.100***  0.100*** 
  [0.063]  [0.073]  [0.0361]  [0.0549] [0.019]  [0.020]  [0.018]  [0.020] 
                 
Number of observations (plant-product)  6,494  6,494  18,541  18,541 49,203  49,203  49,499  49,499 
               
Product  fixed  effects  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Product-specific size polynomial (order 3)  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Product-specific  size-decile fixed effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 52 
Table 4: Quality proxy – ISO 9000 certification dummy (India 1997-98) 
 
All reported figures are coefficients on an exporter dummy which equals 1 if the establishment 
reports positive exports. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
establishment has obtained ISO 9000 quality certification. Size is defined as log total sales of the 
establishment. Only differentiated sectors are included.  Standard errors are clustered at the plant 
level; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
Dependent variable: dummy for ISO 9000 
adoption 0.142***  0.0771***  0.0751*** 0.0854*** 
  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.009] [0.009] 
         
Number observations (plants)  15,937  15,937 15,937 15,937
         
Industry  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes No 
Industry-specific size polynomial (order 2)  No  Yes  No  No 
Industry-specific size polynomial (order 3)  No  No  Yes  No 
Industry-specific size-decile fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes 
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Table 5:  Wage and capital intensity results 
 
All reported figures are coefficients on an exporter dummy which equals 1 if the establishment reports positive exports. Standardized average 
wage is the wagebill of the establishment divided by the number of employees. Capital intensity is total capital divided by the number of 
employees. Size is defined as log total sales of the establishment. Only differentiated sectors are included.  Standard errors are clustered at the 
plant level; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 India  USA  Chile  Colombia 
   (1)  (2)   (3)   (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                 
Dependent variable             
Log average wage (standardized)  0.138***  0.136***  0.082***  0.097***  0.106***  0.131***  0.0458*  0.0922*** 
 [0.032]  [0.035]  [0.014]  [0.014]  [0.027]  [0.027]  [0.025]  [0.026] 
                 
Log average wage  0.0743***  0.0748***  0.032***  0.039***  0.0500***  0.0636***  0.0270***  0.0437*** 
 [0.017]  [0.018]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.014]  [0.014]  [0.010]  [0.010] 
                 
Log capital intensity (standardized)  0.155***  0.188***  -0.191***  -0.178***  0.221***  0.250***  0.130***  0.147*** 
 [0.035]  [0.037]  [0.015]  [0.015]  [0.035]  [0.034]  [0.031]  [0.030] 
                 
Log capital intensity  0.224***  0.266***  -0.188***  -0.175***  0.279***  0.310***  0.145***  0.164*** 
 [0.047]  [0.049]  [0.015]  [0.015]  [0.039]  [0.039]  [0.035]  [0.035] 
                 
Number of observations (plants)  11,226  11,226  123,079  123,079  17,053  17,053  39,990  39,990 
                 
Industry-year fixed effects  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Industry-year specific size polynomial (order 3)  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 




Table 6: Robustness checks: conditioning on employment and domestic sales 
 
All reported figures are coefficients on an exporter dummy which equals 1 if the establishment reports positive exports. Establishment size is 
defined as log employment in panel A and log domestic sales in panel B.   Only differentiated sectors are included. Standard errors are clustered 
at plant level; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  
 India  USA  Chile  Colombia 
Dependent Variable   (1)   (2)   (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                 
Panel A: conditioning on employment                 
Log price (standardized)  0.137**  0.170**  0.139*** 0.133***         
  [0.0558]  [0.0694]  [0.019] [0.020]         
ISO 9000 dummy  0.098***  0.106***             
  [0.009]  [0.009]             
Log average wage (standardized)  0.432***  0.435***  0.223*** 0.234***  0.394***  0.395***  0.325***  0.360*** 
  [0.0347]  [0.0356]  [0.014] [0.014]  [0.0324]  [0.0317]  [0.0315]  [0.0315] 
Log capital intensity (standardized)  0.483***  0.507***  -0.090*** -0.084***  0.488***  0.492***  0.388***  0.387*** 
 [0.0362]  [0.0365]  [0.016] [0.016]  [0.0370]  [0.0360]  [0.0322]  [0.0319] 
Panel B: conditioning on domestic sales                 
Log price (standardized)  0.202***  0.245***  0.138*** 0.134***         
  [0.0589]  [0.0788]  [0.019] [0.020]         
ISO 9000 dummy  0.093***  0.101***             
 [0.008]  [0.009]             
Log average wage (standardized)  0.349***  0.363***  0.133*** 0.140***  0.224***  0.244***  0.209***  0.254*** 
  [0.0318]  [0.0332]  [0.012] [0.013]  [0.0264]  [0.0269]  [0.0256]  [0.0268] 
Log capital intensity (standardized)  0.323***  0.348***  -0.152*** -0.140***  0.301***  0.324***  0.197***  0.211*** 
 [0.0348]  [0.0357]  [0.014] [0.014]  [0.0348]  [0.0345]  [0.0299]  [0.0295] 
                 
Product  or  industry-year  fixed  effects  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Product or industry-year specific size polynomial  (order  3)  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Product or industry-year size-decile fixed effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 55 
Table 7: Log price: Interaction results  
 
The dependent variable is log standardized price.  EXPDUM is an exporter dummy. DESTGDP is 
the standardized (value weighted) average GDP per capita of the destination countries to which a 
product is exported; DESTDIST is the standardized (value weighted) average distance.  SIGMA is 
the (standardized) elasticity of substitution (from Broda and Weinstein, 2006).  Only differentiated 
sectors are included. Standard errors are clustered at plant level; * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  
     (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)     (7)     (8) 
Panel 1: INDIA (1997-98)               
EXPDUM 0.277***  0.263***  0.278***  0.278***  0.130**  0.122  0.210***  0.208** 
 [0.0678]  [0.100]  [0.0689]  [0.102]  [0.0657]  [0.0975]  [0.0684]  [0.0998] 
                 
EXPDUM X DESTGDP  0.0248  0.0997          0.0513  0.0849 
 [0.0604]  [0.0898]          [0.0839]  [0.120] 
EXPDUM X DESTDIST      0.0284  0.115      0.0363  0.105 
      [0.0729]  [0.111]      [0.102]  [0.144] 
EXPDUM X SIGMA          -0.174***  -0.210  -0.0954  -0.143 
          [0.0599]  [0.187]  [0.0757]  [0.189] 
                 
Observations   4,901  4,901  4,901  4,901  6,321  6,321  4,767  4,767 
                 
Panel 2: USA (1997)                 
EXPDUM 0.113***  0.111***  0.147***  0.143***  0.135***  0.131***  0.119***  0.103*** 
  [0.019]  [0.020]  [0.019]  [0.021]  [0.019]  [0.020]  [0.021]  [0.022] 
                 
EXPDUM X DESTGDP  0.086***  0.087***          0.068***  0.090*** 
 [0.021]  [0.022]          [0.026]  [0.029] 
EXPDUM X DESTDIST      0.065***  0.048**      0.029  0.001 
      [0.019]  0.021      [0.025]  [0.027] 
EXPDUM X SIGMA          -0.006  -0.020  -0.022  -0.041 
          [0.031]  [0.035]  [0.031]  [0.034] 
                 
Observations   49,203  49,203  49,203  49,203  49,203  49,203  49,203  49,203 
                 
Product fixed effects  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Product-specific size 
polynomial (order 3) 
Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Product-specific size-decile 
fixed effects 
No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
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Figure A.1:  Percentage of establishments that are exporters, by size percentile  
 
The figures plot the fraction of exporters by 40 size (sales revenue) quantiles for all manufacturing 
sectors. Each establishment is assigned to one of 40 size quantiles within its 4-digit industry. Exporter 
fraction for a quantile is obtained by dividing the number of exporters in that quantile summed across all 
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Table A.1: Log price: Robustness checks  
 
All reported figures are coefficients on an exporter dummy. The exporter dummy equals 1 if the establishment reports positive exports, 
except for row 2 where it equals 1 if the establishment exports more than 2% of their total sales. Price is defined as a unit value (product 
revenue/quantity). Standardized (log) price is (log) price demeaned by the product-specific mean and divided by the product-specific 
standard deviation.  Only differentiated sectors are included. Standard errors clustered at plant level; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%, *** significant at 1%.  
   (1)   (2)   (3)  (4) 
         
Panel 1: India (1997-98)      
Base case: Coefficient on exporter dummy from Panel 1 of Table 2  0.112**  0.130**  0.177***  0.169** 
  [0.050]  [0.060]  [0.063]  [0.073] 
Coefficient on dummy for export share >2%  0.151***  0.120*  0.161**  0.142* 
  [0.056]  [0.064]  [0.068]  [0.079] 
Coefficient on exporter dummy, main product line only  0.171**  0.125  0.179**  0.126 
  [0.080]  [0.087]  [0.091]  [0.11] 
         
Panel 2: USA (1997)         
Base case: Coefficient on exporter dummy from Panel 2 of Table 2  0.082***  0.131***  0.136***  0.135*** 
  [0.018]  [0.019]  [0.019]  [0.020] 
Coefficient on dummy for export share >2%  0.096***  0.133***  0.136***  0.130*** 
  [0.021]  [0.021]  [0.022]  [0.024] 
Coefficient on exporter dummy, main product line only  0.112***  0.122***  0.122***  0.121*** 
  [0.020]  [0.021]]  [0.021]  [0.025] 
         
Product  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes No 
Product-specific size polynomial (order 2)  No  Yes  No  No 
Product-specific size polynomial (order 3)  No  No  Yes  No 
Product-specific size-decile fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes Appendix 
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Table A.2:  Skill intensity measures  
 
All reported figures are coefficients on an exporter dummy which equals 1 if the establishment reports positive exports. The skilled 
share of the wage bill is the ratio of non-production worker wages to total wages.  Skilled share of employment is the share of non-
production workers in total employment.  Both variables are standardized by using 4-digit industry-specific means and standard 
deviations. Only differentiated sectors are included. Standard errors are clustered at plant level; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 India  USA  Chile  Colombia 
                 
Skilled share of the wage bill (standardized)  0.0166  -0.0147  0.244*** 0.239***  0.110***  0.151***  0.121***  0.154*** 
  [0.039]  [0.041]  [0.016] [0.016]  [0.036]  [0.036]  [0.034]  [0.032] 
                 
Skilled share of employment (standardized)  0.0096  -0.0149  0.192*** 0.197***  -0.0228  0.0071  0.0678*  0.0929** 
 [0.0403]  [0.0464]  [0.016] [0.017]  [0.0391]  [0.0420]  [0.0351]  [0.0365] 
                 
Number of observations (plants)  11,226  11,226  123,079 123,079  17,053  17,053  39,990  39,990 
                 
Industry-year  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year specific size polynomial (order  3)  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 





Table A.3: Robustness checks: Using U.S. CMF 1992 
 
All reported figures are coefficients on an exporter dummy which equals 1 if the establishment reports positive exports.  The data 
covers the differentiated products/industries (defined per the Rauch 1999 classification) of the manufacturing sector for the US in 
1992.  For standardized log price, “product/industry” in the last four rows refers to 7-digit product codes; for other variables 
“product/industry” refers to 4-digit SIC (1987) code. Size is defined as log total sales of the establishment.  Only differentiated 
sectors are included. Standard errors are clustered at plant level; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  
Dependent variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Log price (standardized)  0.147***  0.117***  0.121***  0.131*** 
 [0.015]  [0.015]  [0.015]  [0.015] 
         
Log average wage (standardized)  0.313***  0.100***  0.101***  0.112*** 
 [0.015]  [0.017]  [0.017]  [0.018] 
         
Capital intensity (standardized)  0.233***  -0.001  -0.002  0.006 
  [0.018]  [0.014]  [0.014]  [0.014] 
         
         
Product/industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Product/industry-specific size polynomial (order 2)  No  Yes  No  No 
Product/industry-specific size polynomial (order 3)  No  No  Yes  No 
Product/industry size-decile fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes Appendix 
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Table A.4: Robustness checks: conditioning of firm sales and using single-establishment firms  
 
All reported figures are coefficients on an exporter dummy which equals one for firms where at least one establishment exports. The 
data covers the differentiated products/industries (defined per the Rauch 1999 classification) for the U.S. manufacturing sector in 
1997.  For price, “product/industry” in the last 4 rows refers to 7-digit product codes; for other variables “product/industry” refers 
to 4-digit SIC (1987) code.  In all cases, size is defined as the log firm sales. Average wage and capital intensity are defined using firm 
level aggregates.  (Firm and establishment variables are the same for single-establishment firms in panel 2.)  Only differentiated 
sectors are included. Standard errors are clustered at plant level; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  
Dependent variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Panel 1:  All variables defined at the firm level  
Log price (standardized)  -0.015  0.108***  0.121***  0.118*** 
 [0.017]  [0.020]  [0.021]  [0.023] 
Log average wage (standardized)  0.321***  0.065***  0.074***  0.080*** 
  [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.015]  [0.018] 
Capital intensity (standardized)  -0.014  -0.216***  -0.219***  -0.210*** 
  [0.018]  [0.016]  [0.017]  [0.016] 
Panel 2:  Sample restricted to single-establishment firms only   
Log price (standardized)  0.113***  0.149***  0.151***  0.168*** 
 [0.027]  [0.028]  [0.028]  [0.031] 
Log average wage (standardized)  0.331***  0.068***  0.074***  0.090*** 
 [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.017]  [0.017] 
Capital intensity (standardized)  -0.128***  -0.266***  -0.262***  -0.252*** 
  [0.023]  [0.019]  [0.019]  [0.019] 
         
Product/industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Product/industry-specific size polynomial (order 2)  No  Yes  No  No 
Product/industry-specific size polynomial (order 3)  No  No  Yes  No 
Product/industry size-decile fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes Appendix 
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Table A.5:  Robustness to using four-year means of variables  
 
All reported figures are coefficients on an exporter dummy which equals 1 if the establishment reports positive exports. All variables are the 4 
year mean values by establishment.  Establishments that switched exporter status during the 4 year period, or have fewer than 3 observations in 
the four year period are excluded.  Only differentiated sectors are included.  Standard errors are clustered at plant level; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  




   (1)   (2)   (3)  (4) 
         
      
Dependent variable: Standardized average wage  0.180***  0.219***  0.124**  0.234*** 
 [0.0498]  [0.0531]  [0.0540]  [0.0604] 
         
Dependent variable: Standardized capital intensity  0.311***  0.353***  0.164***  0.166*** 
 [0.0618]  [0.0671]  [0.0627]  [0.0633] 
         
Number of observations (plants)  1,978  1,978  3,103  3,103 
         
Industry-year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Industry-year specific size polynomial  (order  2)  No Yes No No 
Industry-year specific size polynomial  (order  3)  No No Yes No 
Industry-year size-decile fixed  effects  No No No Yes Appendix 
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 Table A.6:  Robustness to excluding sectors dependent on external finance and government purchases 
 
All reported figures are coefficients on an exporter dummy which equals 1 if the establishment reports positive exports. The dependent variable is 
standardized log per unit price, i.e. demeaned by the product specific mean and divided by the product specific standard deviation.  Only 
differentiated sectors are included. Standard errors clustered at plant level; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  
  India USA 
   (1)   (2)   (3)  (4) 
         
Panel 1: Excluding products with above median dependence on Rajan-Zingales (2006) external finance measure  
Dependent variable: Standardized price  0.217**  0.263**  0.086***  0.083*** 
 [0.0874]  [0.121]  [0.030]  [0.033] 
         
Panel 2: Excluding products with above median dependence on government purchases (based on US I-O table) 
Dependent variable: Standardized price  0.390***  0.424***  0.169***  0.174*** 
 [0.0983]  [0.148]  [0.033]  [0.036] 
         
Product/industry  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes No 
Product/industry-specific size polynomial (order 2)  No  Yes  No  No 
Product/industry-specific size polynomial (order 3)  No  No  Yes  No 
Product/industry size-decile fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes 
 